The influence of affect on attitude by Clore, Gerald L. & Schnall, Simone
 
11 
The Influence of Affect on Attitude 
Gerald L. Clore 
Simone Schnall 
University of Virginia 
AFFECTIVE INFLUENCE ON ATTITUDE 
Priests of the medieval Catholic Church understood something about the relationship between 
affect and attitude. To instill the proper attitude in parishioners, priests dramatized the power of 
liturgy to save them from Hell in a service in which the experience of darkness and fear gave 
way to light and familiar liturgy. These ceremonies "were written and performed so as to first 
arouse and then allay anxieties and fears" (Scott, 2003, p. 227): 
The service usually began in the dark of night with the gothic cathedral's nave filled with worshippers 
cast into total darkness. Terrifying noises, wailing, shrieks, screams, and clanging of metal 
mimicked the chaos of hell, giving frightened witnesses a taste of what they could expect if they 
were tempted to stray. After a prolonged period of this imitation of hell, the cathedral's interior 
gradually became filled with the blaze of a thousand lights. As the gloom diminished, cacophony was 
supplanted by the measured tones of Gregorian chants and polyphony. Light and divine order 
replaced darkness and chaos (R. Scott, personal correspondence, March 15, 2004). 
This ceremony was designed to buttress beliefs by experience and to transfigure abstractions 
into attitudes. In place of merely hearing about "the chaos and perdition of hell that regular 
performances of liturgy were designed to hold in check" (Scott, 2003), parishioners should 
actually feel reactions of fear and confusion when contemplating Hell, and of hope and relief at 
the familiar sounds of liturgy. 
By what processes do such momentary affective reactions become attitudes? This chapter 
explores some of the answers that social psychologists give to that question. Before proceeding, 
however, we discuss three sets of distinctions that underlie our treatment of affect and attitude. 
The first concerns the similarities and differences among attitudes and affective conditions. 
The second concerns the evaluative and importance information conveyed by the valence and 
arousal dimensions of affect. The third concerns direct versus indirect influences of affect on 
attitude. 
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Three Orienting Distinctions 
Attitudes and Other Evaluative Conditions 
"Affect" refers to evaluative reactions that are embodied. Two common forms of affect are 
moods and emotions, both of which are affective states. "States" exist when multiple systems of 
the organism simultaneously reflect the same condition. Thus, emotional states exist when the 
same affective reaction to the same object is manifest in multiple systems at the same time (Clore 
& Ortony, 2000). For example, a person who is in a state of fear may simultaneously look, feel, 
think, and act afraid, as well as have fearful patterns of physiology and brain activation. If 
emotions are particular kinds of evaluative reactions to objects, and attitudes are also evaluative 
tendencies toward objects, how do attitudes differ from emotions? 
That question is addressed elsewhere (Schimmack & Crites, this volume; Fabrigar, Mac-
Donald, & Wegener, this volume), but a useful additional comparison is that the evaluative 
meanings basic to both emotions and attitudes act differently because they are differently 
constrained (Clore & Colcombe, 2003). Table 11.1 depicts two of these constraints-temporal and 
object constraints. For example, moods and emotions are ephemeral and cannot be stored. 
Whatever evaluative information they carry is temporally constrained, existing only as long as the 
supporting cognitions, perceptions, or other elicitors are active, and vanishing as soon as one is 
no longer in that state. The same is not true of attitudes, because attitudes are not evaluative states, 
but evaluative tendencies, that do not necessarily vanish when one stops thinking about the 
attitude object. Thus, the evaluative meanings of attitudes are not constrained by time and 
may be either temporary or enduring (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
Another kind of constraint concerns whether or not the evaluative meaning is focused on a 
specific object. In that regard, attitudes and emotions are similar. Both are evaluations of 
something specific. By contrast, moods and temperaments are examples of conditions that are not 
dedicated to specific objects. Both are evaluative orientations without built-in direction; without 
being constrained by an object. Thus, cheerful moods and cheerful temperaments may make 
things in general seem positive. But, as shown in Table 11.1, moods differ from temperaments 
in part because the evaluative inclinations of moods are momentary or constrained by time. In 
contrast, evaluative inclinations based in temperament are neither object-specific nor 
temporally-specific. Thus, one can be said to have a cheerful temperament, even if one is 
momentarily cheerless. 
According to Table 11.1, both emotions and attitudes have objects. If so, then understanding 
how emotion influences attitude might involve asking how the evaluative aspects of emotions, 
which are necessarily ephemeral, become an attitudinal evaluation, which has no such temporal 
constraint. 
Table 11.1 indicates that the evaluative inclinations of moods also differ from those of attitudes 
in their object constraints. Hence, understanding how moods influence attitudes involves asking 
how an evaluative state, which was not about anything in particular, becomes constrained to 
be about a specific attitude object. For example, how might simply being in a foul 
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Some Constraints on Evaluative Meaning That Differentiate Attitudes From
 Other Evaluative Conditions 
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Two Dimensions of Information   
FIG. 1 . l .  Valence and Arousal as Two Dimensions of Embodied Affective Experience. 
The subjective experience of affect is generally found to vary along two dimensions 
(valence and arousal), which serve as embodied information (evaluation and 
importance) about the object of the affect. 
mood influence one's attitude toward something? One approach to answering that question lies 
in the information about value and importance that is conveyed in affect. 
 
Affective Value and importance 
Affective experience appears to have both valence and arousal components. These are depicted 
here as independent, bipolar dimensions (Russell, 2003). Valence can also be separated into 
two dimensions, each of which varies in arousal or intensity (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). With 
respect to attitude formation, the valence component can be thought of as embodied evaluation, 
and the arousal component can be thought of as an embodied perception of importance (Frijda, 
Ortony, Sonnemans, & Clore, 1992). This characterization of the experience and the 
information inherent in valence and arousal cues is depicted in Fig. 11.1. 
As discussed by Schimmack and Crites (this volume), emotions arise when situations are 
perceived as positive or negative in some way and also as personally relevant, urgent, or important. 
These appraisals of value and importance are represented in embodied form as feelings that are 
pleasant or unpleasant and that are characterized by high or low arousal. The experience of such 
feelings in turn conveys information that something in a situation is good or bad and important 
or trivial. According to the affect-as-information hypothesis (Clore et al., 2001; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983) affect influences attitude. Positively or negatively valenced feelings then signal 
positive or negative evaluations and attitudes, whereas feelings of arousal commandeer 
attention (Simon, 1967) and make attitude-relevant information memorable (Cahill & McGaugh, 
1998). 
The fact that embodied evaluations signal both Value and Importance is reflected in the 
organization of this chapter. In addition, at a higher level of organization, one can also distin-
guish between affective influences on both the "What" and the "How" of attitude formation 
and change, as we see next. 
 
Affect and the "What" and "How" of Attitude Formation 
and Change 
The impact of affect depends not only on the affect itself, but on what the affect appears to be 
about. Affect tends to transfer its goodness or badness to whatever is in mind at the time. Thus, 
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if one is focused on some object, that object may be experienced as correspondingly good or 
bad. But if one is focused not on an object, but on a task, then the same affective cues can 
influence how information is processed. Thus, one's focus can determine either "What" object is 
good or bad (direct influences) or "How" one should process attitude relevant information 
(indirect influences). 
In the following sections, we review several forms of direct influence, including affective 
conditioning, mere exposure, social influence, and causal attribution. Through direct asso-
ciation, conditioning, and attribution, positive and negative affect can become positive and 
negative attitudes. By contrast, when one focuses on tasks and coping, rather than on objects 
and judgment, affect can have indirect effects on attitude. For example, affect can influence 
whether people use categorical information (e.g., stereotypes, brand names, political party 
affiliation) as opposed to individuating information (e.g., actions of a person, attributes of a 
product, or votes of a candidate). 
We are suggesting that the specific influence of affect depends on the object of one's attention at 
the time. At the broadest level, organisms can attend either to objects or to actions. With 
respect to attitudes, an object focus allows organisms to learn what is good and what is bad in 
their physical and social worlds, whereas an action focus allows them to evaluate how well they 
are coping in that world. 
These two kinds of focus can also be seen in two forms of reward learning: classical 
conditioning and instrumental learning. Like the two forms of affective influence on attitudes, the 
two forms of affective influence on learning involve a transfer of value from affect to object. The 
two forms (whether of affective influence or of learning) differ from each other mainly in the 
kinds of objects to which affective value becomes associated. Pavlov's dogs attended to the 
stimulus of a bell, and the associated affect from the delivery of food presumably generated a 
positive attitude toward that conditioned stimulus. But in the instrumental learning of Skinner's 
pigeons and Thorndike's rats, the affect from reward conferred its value on actions or responses that 
were instrumental in obtaining reward. 
These two kinds of learning correspond to the distinction in cognitive psychology between 
semantic knowledge and procedural knowledge. Semantic knowledge, too, involves information 
about objects in the world, whereas procedural memory involves information about action. We 
raise these distinctions here because they map onto the two kinds of affective influence on 
which we focus. Affect provides evaluative information that can either modify evaluative 
representations of objects in the world (semantic knowledge) or modify evaluations of possible 
responses to such objects (procedural knowledge). Thus, affect can either influence attitude by 
serving directly as information about the value of the attitude object, or indirectly by serving as 
information about the value of one's thoughts or inclinations regarding the object. Finally, we 
distinguish between two kinds of direct effects. One concerns the role of the valence component of 
affect in determining the valence component of attitude, and the other concerns the role of the 
arousal component of affect in making lasting or memorable attitudes. 
Summary 
Three kinds of distinctions are helpful in reviewing research on affect and attitude. One distinction 
is between the evaluative aspects of attitudes and the evaluative aspects of affect. The secret to 
affective influences on attitude is ultimately that both affect and attitudes, despite their differences, 
are evaluative. Thus, the evaluation embodied in affect can be conditioned, associated, inferred, 
attributed or otherwise transformed into the evaluative tendencies of attitude. Conversely, when 
attitudes are strong, attitude objects can also elicit affect. Table 11.1 suggested that two kinds of 
constraints on the generality of these kinds of evaluations distinguish attitude from emotion, 
mood, and temperament. For example, the evaluative meanings in attitude and 
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emotion are both about specific objects. However, since emotions are ephemeral, their evaluative 
meanings are constrained by time, whereas attitudes and their evaluative tendencies need not be 
ephemeral and hence have no such temporal constraints. 
The second distinction is between evaluation and importance. We suggest that the valence 
and arousal components of affective experiences may have different influences on attitude. 
Whereas affective valence signals the goodness-badness of an event, the arousal component 
signals its urgency or importance. 
The third distinction is between affective influences on the "What" and the "How" of attitude 
formation and change. We suggest that the influence of affect depends not only on the affect 
itself, but on what the affect appears to be about. We distinguish whether affect becomes 
associated with a stimulus or with a response. Within a stimulus focus, affect can have a direct 
influence on attitude. Within a response focus, it can have an indirect effect by influencing how one 
processes attitude relevant information such as stereotypes and persuasive messages. We suggest 
that the value transfer from affect to attitude in these two kinds of influence correspond to a 
similar transfer of value from rewards to stimuli in classical conditioning and to responses in 
instrumental learning. We turn next to the first of these—direct influences of affect on attitude. 
Direct Influence of Affect on Attitude 
Classical Conditioning and Affective Association 
Thinking of attitudes as conditioned affective responses is an old and familiar idea (e.g., Razran, 
1954; Staats & Staats, 1958). Hence, one would think that attitudinal conditioning would be 
well understood, and issues about how it works long settled. On the contrary, basic questions 
remain. Moreover, interest in affect and conditioning has never been higher, and recent research 
includes some surprising conclusions (for reviews, see De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; 
Hermans, Baeyens, & Helen, 2003; Kruglanski & Stroebe, this volume). For example, despite the 
fact that classical conditioning would seem to be the mother of all primitive, noncognitive 
explanations for behavior, some reviewers conclude that there is no convincing evidence of 
classical conditioning in humans without conscious awareness of the contingency between 
conditioned and unconditioned stimuli (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). In addition, despite ap-
pearances, the associational process whereby rewards and punishments influence attitudes is 
apparently not really an example of classical or Pavlovian conditioning (De Houwer et al., 
2001). A review of simple evaluative associations versus Pavlovian conditioned responses shows 
a number of instructive differences, which we describe. Before touching on those issues, however, 
a bit of history is in order. 
Associationism. There has long been a desire among philosophers and psychologists to 
use physical principles to understand psychological phenomena. The conditioned reflex is 
one example. Descartes suggested that just as mirrors automatically reflect light, we also have 
"reflexes" that automatically reflect aspects of the environment, as when people withdraw their 
hands from fire. Using that idea, associationist philosophers from Locke to Hume tried to explain 
how moral, cognitive, and affective life might be generated from associations involving such 
reflexes. At the time, this issue was controversial because there was a tension between the idea 
of randomness implied by such associationism and the dominant rationalist theories, which were 
especially concerned with questions of moral order. 
John Sutton (1998), a current day neurophilosopher, suggests that Descartes' associationism, 
which today may seem too mechanistic, was in his day seen as too random. The concern was 
that without executive control over the construction of meaning, people would not be able to 
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maintain a stable moral sense or even a stable self. In contrast, today we seem less concerned 
with people's moral sense (for better or worse), and research suggests a diminished role for 
central processing (Cooney & Gazzaniga, 2003). Indeed, some conclude that our sense of 
executive control (Clark, 1997) and conscious will (Wegner, 2002) are illusory. These trends in 
cognitive science seem quite compatible with the associationism we see in conditioning 
approaches to attitudes. 
Classical Conditioning Of Attitude. Most reviews of conditioning and attitude start with 
Razran's early experiments in which such stimuli as musical selections, paintings, photographs, 
and slogans were presented during free luncheons. In one such experiment, he obtained 
measures of ethnic prejudice from New Yorkers by having them rate photographs of college 
women presented once unlabeled and again two weeks later with Jewish, Italian, or Irish 
names. He then applied the luncheon technique to 12 of the participants. For this part, he 
presented the items that had shown the most bias as they ate a free lunch. Their subsequent 
rerating of the items appeared to show that the free lunch had conditioned away the ethnic bias. It is 
hard to know whether conditioning was actually shown, because items chosen on the basis of 
extremity of response tend to regress to the mean by chance when rerated. Such changes in rating 
might look like attitude change, but not be. However, Razran did other luncheon studies that 
were not subject to such shortcomings. For example, in one, Razran (1954) presented music 
and pictures that had been associated with eating and found that they increased "frequencies of 
food-related free verbalizations, frequencies of food-related rhyme finding, and speed of 
unscrambling food-related letter-scrambled words" (Razran, 1954, p. 274). A second point, 
however, as noted by Razran, is that despite the visceral nature of the stimuli involved, these 
conditioned responses were actually cognitive ones. For example, although the pictures and 
music did remind people of food-related material, there was no evidence for conditioned hunger 
or desire for food, as might have been expected. 
Another early study that is particularly relevant to affect and attitude is Watson and Raynor's 
(1920) famous demonstration of conditioned aversion in Little Albert, a 9-month-old child. The 
study is one of the most cited pieces of research in psychology. However, it consists simply 
of Watson's description of how Little Albert reacted when Watson struck a metal rod with a 
hammer behind the child's head when a white rat (and later a rabbit) was placed before him. 
Textbooks generally overstate the evidence for generalization (as did Watson himself 
subsequently). Little Albert did not, as some suggest (Wolpe, 1958), develop a phobia for rats and 
other furry objects. Also, the study did not illustrate "preparedness" to learn to fear furry things 
(Seligman, 1970). There was clear evidence of some aversion, but the evidence for 
generalization and resistance to extinction was not as impressive as often claimed in textbooks 
(Harris, 1979). Indeed, a week later, reactions were sufficiently weak that Watson instituted 
new conditioning trials to strengthen the aversion. 
Another touchstone in discussions of conditioning and attitude are early experiments by 
Staats and Staats (1958). They showed changes in the evaluation of words referring to nationalities 
(e.g., Dutch, Swedish) or of male names (e.g., Tom, Bill) after repeatedly being associated with 
positive or negative words. For example, the words Swedish and Dutch were paired with positive 
or negative words, whereas the words German, Italian, French, and Greek were paired with 
random words. So, Dutch might be paired with such words as gift, sacred, and happy, 
whereas Swedish might be paired with such words as bitter, ugly, and failure. Afterwards, 
participants were given a booklet with six pages. On each was one of the national names and a 
pleasant to unpleasant rating scale. They were told to indicate how they felt about each word in 
order to see if their feelings influenced their recall. After eliminating nearly 20% of the 
participants who indicated awareness of the pairings, they found that the stimuli associated 
with positive or negative words were rated more and less positively, respectively. 
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In the intervening years, there were several other pivotally important demonstrations of 
attitude conditioning, including studies by Zanna, Kiesler, and Pilkonis (1970) and research by 
Krosnik, Betz, Jussim, and Lynn (1992), which used subliminal affective pictures as a UCS in 
order to control for awareness of the conditioned stimulus-unconditioned stimulus (CS-UCS) 
contingency. More recently, Olson and Fazio (2001) have examined the classical conditioning of 
evaluative reactions by looking at implicit measures of attitude. They paired pictures of two 
Pokemon characters with positive and negative words and images. Each was paired 20 times 
with valence words, and these trials were embedded in 430 other trials. Subjects were told that the 
slides were random, and that their task was simply to hit a response key as fast as possible when 
an image appeared. The task was said to concern video surveillance. They later assessed 
participants' recognition of the pairings and conducted a funnel interview, neither of which 
suggested much awareness. 
The results showed conditioning both on explicit evaluations and on the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT). It is not clear how adequate the funnel interview was, but they eliminated the six of 
56 participants who mentioned one of the contingencies in response to a direct question. An 
evaluation might have emerged only after participants were asked for their opinion (Experiment 1) 
or were asked to make evaluative responses as part of the IAT assessment procedure 
(Experiment 2). In support of this possibility, Olson and Fazio (2002) note that a previous 
study (Fazio, Lenn, & Effrein, 1984) had shown consolidation of evaluative information into an 
attitude only after direct questions about attitude. 
To test this possibility, they repeated the study, but assessed attitude formation by presenting the 
previously conditioned Pokemon characters subliminally. The procedure involved both forward 
and backward masking. Attitude conditioning was still evident even though participants were not 
asked to consciously evaluate the figures. That is, positive and negative words were evaluated 
more quickly when preceded by subliminal exposure to the Pokemon figure of the same 
(conditioned) valence. 
The authors argue that the associations were formed without awareness. The basis of this 
claim is that the results were unaffected by eliminating the 10% of participants who explicitly 
mentioned the associations in response to the question, "Did you notice anything unusual 
about the items that were presented with the Pokemon Shielder and Metapod?" In the original 
Olson and Fazio (2001) studies, awareness was measured by explicit memory for specific 
CS-UCS pairs. Participants were classified as aware only if they could accurately recognize 
which specific items had appeared together, and recognition of such specific item pairings was at 
chance. 
The results suggested that the prior results were not due to procedure-induced, conscious 
evaluation of the attitude objects. On the other hand, the evidence for attitude was the reaction 
time to evaluate the associated words, a procedure which may have kept any prior evaluations 
active. Also, the attitude assessment took place immediately after the association procedure 
and in the same basic situation. 
Awareness. Is awareness of the contingency between the CS and the UCS necessary for 
conditioning? In a 1974 paper, the cognitive psychologist William Brewer reviewed the 
literature and made the surprising conclusion that there was no convincing evidence of classical 
conditioning in humans without awareness. To prepare this chapter, we wrote to him to see if the 
evidence over the intervening 30 years had changed his mind. His response was fascinating. He 
said that despite the lack of evidence, he never doubted the possibility of unconscious 
conditioning in humans. He noted the following quote from his original review: "... given that 
Homo sapiens evolved from much simpler organisms and that the lower brain centers still 
function, it would seem strange if human beings showed no unconscious, automatic learning at 
all" (p. 28). 
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He said that this would have been his reply to our request a week earlier, but that he had just 
learned of a new review (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002) that reaffirmed his original claim and of 
still another, earlier review (Boakes, 1989, p. 389), which stated that "[Brewer's] conclusion 
still stands that there is no convincing evidence for conditioning in human subjects without 
awareness of the contingencies." The gist of the argument made by Lovibond and Shanks 
(2002) is that most of the attempts to assess awareness have simply been inadequate, with the 
result that any evidence that might support the idea of unconscious conditioning is ambiguous. 
Interestingly, just as social psychologists are investing their faith more and more in uncon-
scious determinants of behavior, investigators of conditioning are concluding that classical 
Pavlovian conditioning, the great hope for a peripheralist explanation of behavior, may require 
consciousness (Walther, 2002). However, several researchers have recently argued that the 
kinds of evaluative associations studied by social psychologists are actually not examples of 
classical conditioning of the Pavlovian variety, an issue to which we turn next. 
Evaluative Association vs. Classical Conditioning 
An interesting development in this literature lies in the distinction made by Baeyens, Eelen, 
Crombez, and Van den Bergh (1992) between what they call Pavlovian conditioning and eval-
uative conditioning (or simple association). The distinction is easily made, because classical or 
Pavlovian conditioning is an association of two events, and it concerns developing expectations 
that the UCS will follow the CS, which simply acts as a signal that the UCS is about to occur. 
Thus, when Pavlov sounded a bell, dogs in his lab came to expect food powder in their mouths. 
Expecting food triggered various responses, including salivation, which Pavlov measured, and 
perhaps dopamine and positive affect, which he did not measure. 
The evaluative conditioning done by social psychologists, on the other hand, simply involves 
ensuring that participants process the meaning of two stimuli together, so that one then tends to 
think of them together. Without any electric shock or food powder being involved, no activity is 
required, and there is no necessity to marshal bodily resources to cope with such events. All 
that is required is for the organism to passively process lexical, pictorial, or other valenced items. 
It is rather like a concept learning task (Davey, 1994) or an impression formation task. Thus, 
when neutral Chinese ideographs (CS) are processed at the same time as smiling or angry 
faces (UCS), later thoughts about the ideographs are likely to include the pleasantness or 
unpleasantness of the faces with which they had consistently been paired (Winkielman, 
Zajonc, & Schwarz, 1997). 
Pavlovian conditioning is a form of expectancy learning that allows the organism to prepare 
for responses to an expected event. By contrast, evaluative association simply induces a change in 
valence by making one also think about an associated positive or negative stimulus. The 
difference is in whether the CS makes one prepare for the UCS, or simply think (consciously or 
unconsciously) of the UCS, without expecting it to occur. 
This characterization makes it easy to understand various other differences that have come to 
light between these phenomena. For example, Pavlovian conditioning extinguishes when the 
CS is presented without being followed by the UCS, but evaluative associations show no such 
extinction. Of course, if evaluative associations are more like impression formation or concept 
learning than like conditioning, extinction would not be expected. Our attitude toward a person 
who has been rude to us may not change even if he does not continue to be rude on subsequent 
occasions. 
De Houwer et al. (2001) note that the preparation to cope with a UCS elicited by Pavlovian 
conditioning may be expensive in terms of resources and energy, which may explain why it is 
sensitive to extinction, and why it generally involves awareness of the CS-UCS relation. By 
contrast, evaluative "conditioning" or evaluative association is a simpler process of determining 
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the valence of a stimulus by averaging across the valence of the stimuli with which it co-occurred in 
the past (Baeyens, Helen, & Crombez, 1995). 
Although De Houwer et al. (2001) still use the term "conditioning," some question whether the 
conditioning metaphor is really helpful in thinking about results from the evaluative association 
paradigm. For instance, Davey (1994) suggests conceptual categorization might be a more 
accurate characterization of the process. If a CS is processed in the context of a positive UCS, for 
example, then aspects of the CS that can be considered positive become salient. One essentially 
recategorizes the CS on the basis of these newly salient features within the context provided by 
the UCS. More generally, perhaps what contexts do is to get one to respond to contextually 
appropriate aspects or subvarieties of a stimulus. 
This idea also explains context effects in studies using the IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998). The results of IAT studies often make people look both sexist and racially 
prejudiced. However, if one changes the usual context, the prejudiced pattern of response times can 
be made to disappear. For example, Lowery, Hardin, and Sinclair (2001) found that responses 
by White participants that would reflect negative stereotypes of African Americans did not appear 
in an IAT study with a black experimenter. Presumably, in that context, the category "Black" 
suggested people like the experimenter, rather than nameless, faceless, stereotypic black 
persons. 
Regardless of how one thinks about studies of attitude conditioning, it seems clear that 
attitude responses can be created or altered by pairing neutral stimuli with stimuli that already 
have evaluative meaning. DeHouwer et al. (2001) suggest that the method provides a means to 
shape the way people behave toward new or previously neutral stimuli such as products, 
people, or ideas. Conditioning has long enjoyed the status of a basic process in terms of which 
other more complex processes might be explained. But it may be illuminating to consider still 
more basic processes. 
The Gestalt Basis of Conditioning, Priming, and Mood Effects 
In their review of affective conditioning, Hermans et al. (2003) suggested that priming and 
conditioning are curiously similar techniques. Both involve one stimulus followed by a second. In 
priming, the first influences reactions to the second, whereas in conditioning, the second 
influences responses to the first. At some level, the processes involved are presumably similar or 
identical. Indeed, at a still more basic level, they are also similar to the processes involved in the 
affective influence of mood on judgment. 
These three processes are similar in the sense that in each an evaluation of one thing is 
influenced by its association with something else. In priming studies, the evaluative meaning of 
an initial prime influences responses to a later target. Both conditioning and priming employ 
evaluative words or pictures, but they involve different temporal relations. In conditioning, the 
target to be influenced comes before the source of evaluation, whereas in priming, the order is 
reversed. In both, reactions to the target are influenced by reactions to other stimuli presented at 
about the same time. In mood studies, both the nature of the evaluative stimulus and the 
timing of stimuli are different. The source of evaluation is the affect from background mood 
(rather than of affect from an evaluative word or picture), and the target is presented during the 
mood (rather than before, as in priming, or after, as in conditioning). When asked for a 
judgment, one may attend to how one feels, and an association is thus formed between affect 
and the target stimulus or object of judgment. But the processes seem very similar regardless of 
whether the effective stimulus is the positive meaning of a word or pleasant affect, and 
whether the affective information comes before, after, or during the processing of the target. 
Underlying the particulars of these paradigms of attitude research, one can find a unity of 
process. Not only attitude formation, but also everyday sense-making depends on an automatic 
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tendency to knit the separate experiences of each moment into a seamless narrative fabric. In 
filmmaking, this process is known by the French term montage (editing). Exploited today in all 
films, it was originally developed by the early Russian filmmaker Serge Eisenstein, who 
appreciated that successive scenes in a film are automatically linked together, which makes a 
compelling way to tell a story. Thus, if frames of a crouching tiger are followed by frames of a 
woman screaming, we seem to have witnessed the heroine's fear of a charging tiger, but if the 
initial scene had depicted a small child crawling along a window ledge, we would have 
experienced her fear of the child falling. The alternative technique for filming, mise en scene 
shows all of the relevant elements in a single scene. The French term meaning "placing on 
stage," is now used in film studies to designate how a particular scene is framed. As in film, so in 
reality, the emotional meaning of a moment depends on what experiences succeed each other or are 
associated in time. We are suggesting simply that just as successive sequences of scenes on film 
become a narrative whole, so the experience of affect also joins with whatever else is in mind at the 
time to form a narrative. This tendency for current mental content to be taken as the object of affect 
has been referred to as the "affective immediacy principle" (Clore et al., 2001). 
One way to view all these phenomena is in terms of the Gestalt principle by which stimuli 
experienced closely in time and space are automatically seen as connected (Heider, 1958). At 
each unfolding moment, we rely on the content of short-term memory to provide coherence. 
Brain-damaged individuals with short-term memory deficits frequently find themselves con-
fused, because without some short-term carryover from the last moment, the current moment 
makes no sense (Sacks, 1985). Normal individuals sometimes have related experiences when 
they make comments such as, "I know I came in here to get something, but I can't remember 
what it was." 
In this segment, we have suggested that conditioning, priming, and mood effects may rest on 
a more basic mechanism that might be called "experiential montage." Before leaving the 
conditioning topic, we examine in the next segment some limitations of conditioning as an 
explanation of the role of affect in attitude. In that discussion, we make two points. The second of 
those is that cognitive, cultural, and interpersonal processes, rather than conditioning, often 
mediate the influence of affect on attitude. The first point, to which we now turn, concerns the 
assumption that almost anything can become conditioned to almost anything else. We noted 
earlier that this randomness assumption was seen as objectionable during the era of the 
Enlightenment because it threatened belief in a moral order. In the next section we suggest that the 
assumption is objectionable today because it appears to be false. 
Limitations of Conditioning Explanations 
The enthusiasm with which we pursue conditioning as a primary explanation of everyday 
attitudes should perhaps also be tempered by other evidence, such as the findings of a study of 
attitudes toward dogs (Doogan & Thomas, 1992; see also Rimm, Janda, Lancaster, Nahl, & 
Dittmar, 1977). A survey of 100 college students and 30 children showed that only about half had 
early experiences that could have directly conditioned a fear of dogs, and many of these were 
simply additional recollections of being afraid rather than instances of harm. The other 
individuals seemed to have learned primarily by observation, parental warnings, and TV news 
stories about dog attacks. 
Biological Preparedness. Not all stimuli have an equal potential of becoming con-
ditioned stimuli. For example, simply by virtue of being primates, we are likely to develop a 
more or less negative attitude to snakes and spiders. Neither we nor our chimpanzee cousins are 
apparently born with this attitude, but rather we come "prepared" (Seligman, 1970) to learn 
the attitude. The evolutionary argument is simply that primates who readily learned to 
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avoid snakes, spiders, and angry faces had a greater chance to become one of our grandparents 
than those who did not. It is assumed that such preparedness for fear learning can operate 
automatically and be independent of conscious processing. The best known evidence comes 
from Mineka, Davidson, Cook and Keir (1984) showing that young monkeys readily learn to fear 
snakes simply by seeing another monkey show fear. 
A systematic examination using pictures of snakes as conditioning stimuli has been done by the 
Swedish investigator Arne Öhman (Öhman & Soares, 1998). He and his collaborators find that 
when briefly presented pictures of snakes are visually masked and followed by electric shock, 
skin conductance responses readily become conditioned. The remarkable part of these 
experiments is that the unconscious exposure to snakes or spiders or angry faces readily led to 
conditioning, but pairing unconscious presentations of pictures of flowers, mushrooms, or happy 
faces did not result in conditioned skin conductance responses. 
Even when associated images of mushrooms were equally reliable signals of shock onset, 
there was little attitude conditioning. Such results suggest that we are more prepared to dislike 
snakes than we are to dislike mushrooms. However, if ingestion of mushrooms were followed by 
nausea and vomiting, they too could become intensely disliked, an example of the well known 
Garcia effect (Garcia & Koelling, 1966). In the original demonstration, Garcia discovered that 
rats will readily associate taste, but not visual or auditory cues, with nausea. Amazingly, an 
association is formed even when a taste is separated from nausea by hours. Further, if the food is 
novel, a single association can establish an aversion that lasts for years. 
Öhman and Soares (1998) concluded that such "prepared" stimuli are detected by an auto-
matic preattentive system that acts independently of controlled attentional processes. Similarly, 
Garcia showed taste aversion conditioning even with unconscious animals. On the other hand, 
might the preparedness studied by Öhman simply be some weak dislike? Then, when sub-
liminal exposure triggers reactions that are weak, but compatible with the reactions elicited by 
shock, conditioning might occur more easily than to stimuli without such a headstart. The 
different reaction to mushrooms when associated with shock and with nausea might mean that a 
match between the mode of exposure (e.g., ingestion) and the locus of negative outcome (e.g., 
nausea in the stomach) is critical. In any case, the notion that conditioning involves random 
association of stimulus and response may not be tenable on biological grounds. 
Cognitive Preparedness. Analogous limitations concern our cognitive preparedness to 
make certain associations between affect and attitude objects. Affective reactions to stimuli are 
usually embedded in mental and causal models that support their association. Thus, adults who 
burn their linger on the stove may be surprised at their clumsiness, but they are not 
surprised that pain could follow such an act. They need not have the experience again and 
again to establish an association. Even the least sophisticated of us have a crude mental model of 
heat transfer that supports associations between the stimulus of heat and the pain of being 
burned. Associations are involved, of course, but the experience of being burned enlivens an 
already existing, nonrandom association based in a latent mental model that supports and 
maintains the association. Similarly, an experience of being bullied by adolescent males with 
tattoos would likely be enmeshed in at least a half-baked model that makes that association 
more likely than one that might support an expectation that one would be bullied by the class 
president or the valedictorian. Once one has the idea that certain kinds of individuals may 
present certain kinds of threats under certain conditions, one has an attitude. But the critical 
association is likely to be one based on cognitive structures of knowledge and belief. 
Cultural Preparedness. The appeal of affect and of conditioning as explanations for 
attitude lies partly in their apparent simplicity and seemingly non-cognitive nature. However, 
the affective influence on some attitudes comes not from conditioning, but from cultural 
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ideology. For example, cross-cultural research on negative attitudes toward obese people suggests that the 
ability of obesity to elicit negative affect depends on implicit inferences about blame, which in turn 
implicate ideological and cultural assumptions. Crandall et al. (2001) found evidence that prejudice against 
obese people is based on assumptions of individual responsibility, which are predominant in individualistic, 
but not collectivist cultures. Crandall et al. refer to their approach as an "ideological theory of prejudice." 
They define ideology as a network of interrelated beliefs and values that "not only enshrine ideas and 
explanations but entail evaluation and affect" (Brown, 1973, p. 13). 
In the foregoing, we suggest that psychologists have placed too much faith in the infinite malleability 
of associations and hence of attitudes. In the following section, we suggest that we may also have placed 
too much faith in the correlated assumption that affective meaning comes from simple, primitive processes. 
In the experiments by Staats and Staats (1958) the names of countries were presented with positive or 
negative words. These studies suggest that people learn attitudes by associating positive or negative concepts 
to persons or groups. Presumably affective comments from others do influence our attitudes, but some (Sinclair, 
Huntsinger, Skorinko, & Hardin, 2003) suggest that such influences arise as part of a process of maintaining 
our own identities, rather than by classical conditioning. In addition, linguists realized early on that mere 
association probably would not take us very far in understanding semantic learning (Chomsky, 1968). 
Bottom-up explanations dominated psychology until the cognitive revolution highlighted the top-down 
role played by cognitive structure. Analogously, it should not be a surprise that social attitudes often also 
reflect social structure and interpersonal relations. In that regard, an alternative understanding of how we learn 
word meanings (including evaluative meanings), is known as "Theory of Mind." That approach, to which we 
now turn, serves as our final limitation of bottom-up, classical conditioning approaches to attitude learning. 
Theory of Mind. "Theory of mind" refers to the understanding that people have mental states such as 
thoughts, beliefs, and desires that can be inferred from behavior. Although Premack and Woodruff 
(1978), who coined the term, investigated mind-reading abilities in chimpanzees, "theory of mind" entered 
into the study of human development and has generated a great amount of empirical research on how children 
acquire this fundamental aspect of social cognition (e.g., Astington, 2000; Leslie, 1987; Lewis &Mitchell, 1994; 
Wellman, 1990; Zelazo, Astington, & Olson, 1999). 
In his book on the learning of word meaning, Paul Bloom (2000) proposes that theory of mind is 
crucial for understanding how children learn what things mean. In a comparison that is potentially 
informative for attitude theorists, he contrasts two forms of learning. One was suggested by John Locke and 
the other by St. Augustine. Locke proposed that we learn word meanings by association. With repeated 
association between hearing a name and seeing an object, a child will respond to the presentation of the 
stimulus object with the response of the name. Augustine, on the other hand, suggested that word meanings 
are actually learned from one's elders in context as the child infers the intent of others who use particular 
words. Bloom proposes that Augustine had the right idea, and that research bears him out. His elaboration 
of the Augustinian account of how he learned the meanings of words as a child is framed in terms of theory 
of mind. 
Theory of mind research is based on the idea that much of a child's cognitive development hinges on the 
child coming to understand what other people have in mind when they do or say something. The focus is 
not limited to figuring out specific and localized references, but assumes also that we operate out of a more 
general theory of other people's perspectives. It is important to note that investigators of theory of mind 
do not assume that children are engaged in deep philosophical thought. On the contrary, the power of the 
approach lies in the 
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idea that under the broad umbrella of "theory of mind" are a host of inferential moves, which 
children (and the rest of us) employ more or less automatically. For instance, at some point in 
development, children come automatically to use the gaze of others to disambiguate what they 
mean when they refer to something in the room. Indeed, even in the second year of life, 
children develop an intense interest in the behavior of others and can already make accurate 
inferences about false beliefs on the part of others (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2002). 
The importance of such automatic social information processing can be seen dramatically by 
considering the difficulty of interacting with autistic children (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & 
Cohen, 1993). An important way of understanding many of the cognitive aspects of autism is 
precisely that they are deficient in theory of mind. They tend to be focused on the non-living, 
mechanical aspects of their environment, and often have special difficulty with language and 
communication. For example, autistic children experience another person's words to refer to 
what they themselves are looking at, rather than using the speaker's gaze. Normally, auto-
matic social inference processes are quite fundamental for social interaction and for cognitive 
development generally. 
If understanding how word meanings are learned requires a theory of mind perspective, then 
understanding how affective meanings are learned may too. The potential explanatory power of 
the approach recommends it to social psychologists, but theory of mind is also appealing 
because it provides an appropriately social perspective on attitude learning. 
 
Category-Triggered Affect  
Another socially-derived, top-down approach to affect and attitude draws on schema theory. 
Fiske (1982) pointed out that we can have strong affective reactions to individuals we have 
never encountered simply by thinking of them as members of a category to which we already 
have affective reactions. In her treatment of schema-triggered affect, she proposed that as we 
apply a schema or category to others, they tend to inherit whatever affective reaction we have to 
the category. Thus, in political discourse, or what passes for political discourse during elections, 
candidates attempt to get voters to place their opponents in undesirable categories and to place 
themselves in desirable categories. They do so in the knowledge that individuals are painted with 
the same brush as the categories of which they are seen to be members. 
When individuals are stereotyped, they are assumed to have all of the attributes that are 
stereotypically seen as characteristic of the group to which they belong. However, in addition, 
Fiske and Pavelchek (1986) provided a model of both piecemeal and category-based eval-
uation, suggesting that categorization occurs first, and is followed by piecemeal processing if 
categorization is not successful. According to the model, encountering an attitude object 
elicits existing attitudes toward the object. Other attribute information may be ignored if it is 
inconsistent with the category activated by the stimulus. 
The model has also been applied in marketing contexts. At great expense, producers of 
consumer goods attempt to create positive stereotypes about their brand name. They bank on the 
idea that products introduced within a positive brand name will inherit the brand-based affect. 
Conversely, companies involved in direct mail marketing have the reverse problem. They 
often attempt to disguise the mail they send out to avoid it being categorized as "junk mail," 
because it is a negative category and mail thus categorized is more likely to be thrown away 
than read (Zhao, 1993). Thus, they may include category-inconsistent features, such as the use 
of handwriting, rather than printing, or the use of the recipient's name, rather than a generic 
address such as "Resident." 
We discuss the affective dynamics of categorization and stereotyping further in a later 
section. For now, however, we turn our attention from such molar processes to a very molecular 
process of affective influence-mere exposure. 
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Mere Exposure 
Mere exposure describes the observation that the repeated, unreinforced presentation of a 
stimulus is sufficient to increase positive affect toward that stimulus, relative to a stimulus 
that has not been presented repeatedly. In a classic study, Zajonc (1968) presented Chinese-
looking characters, nonsense words, or yearbook photographs for either 0, 2, 5, 10, or 25 
times to participants. Participants subsequently rated how "good" or "bad" the meanings of the 
Chinese characters or of the nonsense words were, and how much they liked the person shown in 
the photographs. For all three kinds of stimuli, participants' ratings increased with increasing 
numbers of presentations. Many studies have since replicated and extended this basic effect, 
suggesting that the mere exposure effect is a robust phenomenon (Bornstein, 1989). The effect has 
been documented for a great number of different stimuli, including ecologically relevant 
stimuli, such as foods (Crandall, 1984; Rogers & Hill, 1989), drinks (Pliner, 1982), music 
(Peretz, Gaudreau, & Bonnel, 1998), brand names (Baker, 1999; Janiszwewski, 1993), and 
urban environments (Herzog, Kaplan, & Kaplan, 1976). 
Bornstein and colleagues (Bornstein, Leone, & Galley, 1987) also investigated the appli-
cability of the mere exposure effect to social situations of everyday life. Participants were 
subliminally primed with the photograph of a person they later interacted with (a confederate in 
the experiment), or a blank slide. Subsequently, the participant and two confederates were 
asked to evaluate poems to determine if their author was a man or a woman. Participants were 
more likely to agree with the confederate with whose face they had been primed. These and 
other findings (e.g., Moreland & Beach, 1992) suggest that the mere exposure effect is relevant to 
phenomena occurring outside of the psychological laboratory. 
Increased liking of a stimulus also occurs when participants are not consciously aware of 
having been repeatedly exposed to that stimulus. The first demonstration of a mere exposure 
effect with subliminal stimulus presentation was documented by Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc 
(1980). Polygons were shown for 1 ms, five times each. Participants consistently preferred 
previously seen polygons over new ones, although they indicated recognizing those previously 
exposed only at chance level. Thus, conscious awareness of the stimuli does not appear to be 
necessary for mere exposure effects to occur (Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000; see 
Bornstein, 1992). 
Bornstein and D'Agostino (1992) specifically compared the magnitude of mere exposure 
effects of consciously perceived versus subliminally presented stimuli. Either polygons or 
yearbook photographs were presented for either 5 ms or 500 ms, and were subsequently masked. 
They were presented for 0, 1,5, 10, or 20 exposures. After repeated exposure, participants 
rated each on scales measuring affect (like-dislike) and recognition (old-new). Consistent 
with previous findings, frequently exposed figures and faces received more positive ratings 
than infrequently exposed figures. In addition, the effects were significantly larger for stimuli 
presented for 5 ms, compared with stimuli presented for 500 ms. Because effect sizes tended to 
be greater when stimuli were not recognized, Bornstein (1989) concluded that awareness tends 
to inhibit the mere exposure effect. 
Although mere exposure has been documented in hundreds of studies, explanations re-
garding its mechanism remain controversial. Whereas some have argued for an affective basis 
(Zajonc, 1980, 2001), others have argued for a cognitive basis (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992; 
Klinger & Greenwald, 1994). 
Early attempts to explain mere exposure effects did not fare well in empirical tests, because 
they were unable to explain the later emerging findings involving stimuli presented outside of 
conscious awareness (see Harrison, 1977; Stang, 1974, Bornstein, 1989 for reviews). More 
recent explanations have identified a central role of perceptual fluency or ease of processing as 
a result of repeated stimulus exposure. 
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Theories that account for the mere exposure effect in terms of fluency fall into two categories. 
Some investigators propose that fluency has no affective valence (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 
1994; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987). Others propose 
that fluency has a positive valence (e.g., Harmon-Jones & Alien, 2001; Reber, Winkielman, & 
Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). 
As an example of the first approach, Mandler et al. (1987) proposed a nonspecific activation 
model in which repeated exposure leads to increased accessibility of the stimulus represen-
tation. As a consequence, participants should rate any stimulus property, including affective 
judgments of liking, as more extreme. Evidence for this hypothesis is that participants rate 
nonaffective properties (e.g., brightness or darkness of stimuli) more highly for frequently 
exposed stimuli (Mandler et al., 1987). Hence, an important aspect of this model is that fluency 
leads to more extreme judgments of any kind, whether positive or negative, affective or 
nonaffective. Related to this view is the perceptual fluency/attributional model (Bornstein, 1992; 
Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994; Jacoby et al., 1989). It suggests that perceptual fluency is simply 
misattributed as liking. Support for this position comes from the finding that the effect size 
depends on the delay between stimulus presentation and ratings (Bornstein, 1989). The higher 
the delay, the more positive the ratings, suggesting that time passing after stimulus exposure 
reduces the likelihood that participants correctly attribute affective responses to previous 
exposure. In other words, when participants are aware of having seen the stimulus previously, 
the experience of fluency is simply attributed to frequency of exposure and not to liking. 
Similarly, lower ratings are found when participants are explicitly given alternate explanations for 
the experience of fluency (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994). Conversely, subliminal presentation 
makes the correct attribution of fluency impossible, leading to larger effects than supraliminally 
presented stimuli (Bornstein, 1989).When presentation times allow awareness, effects are 
strongest for very brief exposure times (< 1 s) and get increasingly weaker with larger 
exposure times (Bornstein, 1989). 
If fluency is indeed the driving force behind the mere exposure effect, then manipulations that 
increase fluency should lead to more positive evaluations. In other words, perceived fluency by 
itself should create the mere exposure effect in the absence of repeated stimulus presentations. 
Precisely this effect was found in several studies (Reber et al., 1998). For example, in one 
study pictures of objects were shown to participants. In order to manipulate fluency, some 
pictures were preceded by a subliminal presentation of their contours, whereas other pictures 
were preceded by contours of other objects. As expected, those pictures whose own contours had 
appeared first were liked better than the other pictures. Thus, a "mere exposure" effect was 
created even when all pictures were presented only once. Additional studies manipulating fluency 
demonstrated that similar effects to those of perceptual fluency have been obtained with 
conceptual fluency (see Winkielman et al., 2003). 
However, Winkielman and colleagues (Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; 
Winkielman et al., 2003) argue that high fluency, that is, fast and effortless processing of infor-
mation, may signal positive states of the environment, and of one's own cognitive processes. As 
a result, fluency leads to positive affect as well as to positive evaluations of target stimuli. 
Repeated stimulus exposure results in higher ratings of positive affect than single exposures 
(Monahan et al., 2000). The same picture arises from EMG measures in that high fluency is 
associated with activation of the zygomaticus muscle used for smiling, but not with the corru-
gator muscle used for frowning. Thus high fluency appears to involve positive affect, but not 
negative affect (Harmon-Jones & Alien, 2001; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). 
The nonspecific activation model proposed by Mandler and colleagues (1987) and the related 
perceptual fluency/attributional model (Bornstein, 1992; Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994) suggest 
that repeated exposure leads to higher ratings of any stimulus-relevant dimension. However, 
Winkielman et al. (2003) note that the data on this issue are equivocal. Although 
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Mandler et al. (1987) found increases in ratings for brightness and darkness, they did not 
find increased "disliking" of frequently exposed stimuli. A similar finding was reported by 
other researchers (Seamon, McKenna, & Binder, 1998), who in fact were not able to replicate 
Mandler et al.'s (1987) findings on stimulus brightness and darkness. 
Further, studies of affective evaluations demonstrate an asymmetric effect, such that only 
positive evaluations, but not negative evaluations, are influenced by fluency manipulations, 
regardless of how questions concerning the ratings are worded. For instance, Reber et al. 
(1998) found that high fluency led to increased judgments of liking and decreased judgments of 
disliking. Similarly, Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) instructed half of their participants to 
report their positive affect, and half to report their negative affect after a fluency manipulation. 
Only positive affect increased when exposed to high fluency. Those reporting negative affect did 
not show similar increases. In addition, as noted above, measures of facial muscle activity only 
revealed activation for muscles involved in positive affect, but not for those involved in 
negative affect (Harmon-Jones & Alien, 2001; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). 
To summarize, recent research on the mere exposure effect has focused on whether ex-
periences of perceptual fluency have an affective valence or not. Data by Winkielman using 
multiple methods suggest that fluency does have a positive affective quality. Given that we all 
have implicit goals to comprehend our surroundings (Kelly, 1955), cognitive fluency should 
indeed be positive (see Mackie & Smith, 2002). Thus, an affective component appears to be 
part of the processes that result in the mere exposure effect. Zajonc (2001) recently proposed 
another affective mechanism involved in the mere exposure effect. He argued that it can be 
viewed as an example of classical conditioning in which the absence of negative consequences 
serves as a rewarding unconditional stimulus. However, direct data supporting this conjecture are 
currently lacking, and would perhaps be difficult to obtain. Yet, evidence has been accumulating 
that the mere exposure effect is mediated by affect, albeit not in the manner that Zajonc (1980) 
initially envisioned. 
Zajonc (1980) saw the mere exposure effect as an example of affect that was not mediated by 
cognition. The critical finding was that the effect is larger when people are unaware of having 
previously been exposed to the relevant stimulus. If one assumes that most cognitive operations are 
unconscious, however, then that finding takes on a different significance. From an affect-as-
information perspective, the finding mirrors the dynamics also seen in mood research (see Clore & 
Colcombe, 2003). Affect (regardless of whether it is from mood, frequent prior exposure, or 
some other source) is likely to influence liking of unrelated objects only if the true source of the 
affect is ambiguous or unknown. In the mere exposure paradigm, the positive affect is from 
fluency of processing rather than anything inherent in the stimulus. When the fluency is 
experienced as familiarity from prior exposure rather than as spontaneous liking, then the mere 
exposure effect is less likely to be observed. To explore further the role of unexplained affect in 
attitude, we turn next to the mood and judgment paradigm. 
Mood and Evaluative Judgment 
Affective feelings elicited by objects routinely influence evaluative judgments of them. In 
addition, irrelevant feelings arising from associated happy or sad moods can also affect such 
evaluative judgments (e.g., Esses & Zanna, 1995; Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984; Forgas & 
Moylan, 1991; Gasper & Clore, 1998; Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1993; Ottati & Isbell, 
1996). However, as in the case of mere exposure, affect from mood tends to influence liking 
only when the cause of the affect is not obvious. But before reviewing relevant research, some 
background is in order. 
Background. In the 1960s and 1970s social psychologists were not receptive to the idea that 
phenomenal experience played a role in attitude and evaluative judgment. The emphasis 
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was on how people combine information in attitudes and impressions. Research focused on 
whether people add (Fishbein, 1963), average (Anderson, 1965), or respond to proportions 
(Byrne & Clore, 1966) of positive and negative information (see Wyer & Albarracín, this 
volume). Less often asked were questions about what information enters into attitudes. Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975) maintained that attitudes are based on beliefs and evaluations concerning 
properties of attitude objects, whereas Clore and Byrne (1974) emphasized the role of affective 
feelings. Progress in resolving such disputes was slow because feelings and beliefs about 
particular objects tend to be highly correlated. Although problematic for research, such a 
confounding of beliefs and feelings is advantageous in everyday life. If people's feelings 
and beliefs routinely conflicted (see Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Wegener, this volume), making 
ordinary decisions could be laborious and unreliable. 
Method. Charles Gouaux (1971) solved the research problem by showing mood-inducing 
films to his subjects. In this way, he varied feelings independently of beliefs. At about the same 
time, Griffitt and Veitch (1971) did something similar by conducting an experiment in either a 
normal room or a hot and crowded room. These investigators found that feelings could 
influence attitude and attraction independently of beliefs, but more importantly, they devised a 
new research tool. Since then, mood induction procedures have become a staple in social 
psychology. The technique is valuable as a way of independently varying thoughts and feelings, 
despite the fact that they are ordinarily thoroughly entwined. 
Memory-Based Models. Despite demonstrations that affect does influence judgment, 
investigators were reluctant to assign a primary role to feelings. The mood method caught on, but 
initial explanations reverted to the traditional idea that judgments must be based on beliefs about 
objects of judgment. At about the same time, both Isen (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978) 
and Bower (Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978) proposed memory-based models of affective 
influence. Using the idea of spreading activation from Anderson and Bower's (1973) human 
associative memory (HAM) model, they treated mood as a node in a memory network. When 
moods are induced, they suggested, activation spreads from the mood node to mood-congruent 
concepts in semantic memory and to mood-congruent events in episodic memory. In this way, 
mood could influence judgment by making accessible a biased sample of information from 
memory. For example, in happy moods, one is more likely to recall positive information about a 
target object, and hence bias judgment in a positive way. A virtue of these models was that 
they were consistent with traditional approaches (Arkes & Hammond, 1986), which emphasized 
that judgments are based on beliefs. The role of emotion, therefore, was assumed to be indirect, 
determining which beliefs were retrieved from memory to serve as the basis for judgment. 
Affect-as-Information Model. The affect-as-information view is a general approach to 
which many investigators have made contributions, elaborations, and variations. Wyer and 
Carlston (1979) suggested that the knowledge or information that one was in a mood might 
itself influence attitude and attraction. They focused on affective knowledge or information 
about one's feelings. Schwarz and Clore (1983) applied the idea but have emphasized the 
embodied information of feelings, rather than conceptual information about feelings. They 
examined the role of mood in judgments of life satisfaction in two experiments. 
In one experiment, they asked participants ostensibly to help in the construction of a Life 
Event Inventory (LEI). Participants were to supply a detailed description of a happy or sad 
experience in their recent past which in fact served as a mood induction technique. In a second 
experiment, the researchers relied on warm and sunny versus cold and rainy spring weather to 
induce happy and sad moods. In that study, they asked questions about life satisfaction 
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during a telephone interview conducted on either warm and sunny or cold and rainy days. 
Each experiment showed that happy moods led to higher ratings of life satisfaction compared to 
those by individuals in sad moods. 
The experiments also included attribution manipulations, which consisted of making salient a 
plausible alternative cause of participants' feelings. The first experiment was conducted in an 
odd, sound-proofed room covered in insulation and electrical shielding. The oddness of the room 
was exploited in a cover story suggesting that spending time in the room might make them feel tense 
(or pleasantly relaxed). Participants were given an opportunity to rate how much the room 
contributed to their current feelings before making their life satisfaction ratings. 
In the second experiment, the telephone interviewer had said that he was calling from 
Chicago, so that for half of the respondents, he could ask at the beginning, "By the way, how is 
the weather down there?" The purpose of that pleasantry was to make salient an external 
possible cause for their feelings, which was in this case the true cause. 
Schwarz and Clore (1983) found that in both experiments, the effects of mood on judg-
ments of life satisfaction disappeared in the condition in which an external plausible cause for 
their feelings was salient (the sound-proofed room or the sunny or rainy weather). At the 
end of the interview, respondents were also asked about their current mood, and it is 
important to note that the external attribution manipulation had no effect on self-reported 
mood. Rather than changing how they felt, the external attributions changed the apparent 
relevance of the experienced information of happy and sad feelings for determining life sat-
isfaction. Once attributed to being in an odd room or experiencing foul weather, feelings of 
sadness, for example, were not experienced as informative about their level of life satisfaction. 
The results suggested that affect can influence judgment directly, provided that it is ex-
perienced as a reaction to the object of judgment. Moreover, the effect did not appear to be an 
obligatory consequence of affect, but instead was contingent on how it was experienced; that is, 
on the apparent information value of the affect. This account contrasts with the idea that mood 
automatically activates mood-congruent material in memory and then serves as the basis for 
judgment. It is common, of course, to make judgments on the basis of what comes to mind 
about the object of judgment. But independently of such belief-based judgments, it appears 
that people also (implicitly) ask themselves, "How do I feel about it?" (Schwarz & Clore, 
1988). 
The misattribution paradigm is useful for analytic purposes to disentangle affect from 
beliefs. The results do not imply that the affect of attitude is easily misattributed. Indeed, 
specific attitudes, like specific emotions, should be resistant to misattribution, because their 
affect is already dedicated to an object (see Table 11.1). 
Research showing that mood effects on evaluative judgments are actually due to mood can be 
seen from a study by Strack, Schwarz, and Gschneidinger (1985). They asked participants to 
describe happy or sad life events either in a vivid or in a pallid way. They found that only vivid 
accounts produced moods and mood-congruent judgments. In contrast, pallid accounts tended 
to produce the opposite. Specifically, they judged their life satisfaction to be greater after recalling 
unpleasant experiences than after recalling pleasant ones. Their judgments contrasted their current 
lives to the positivity or negativity of the events they had recalled. Thus, event recall by itself 
does not have the same effect on judgment as mood. 
The difference between an affect-as-information explanation and a memory-based expla-
nation can be seen by imagining being asked how much one likes one's meal at a restaurant. 
Traditional judgment theory (Anderson, 1981) would suggest that we answer such questions by 
retrieving stored evaluations from memory. Essentially one would be saying, "I know that I am 
enjoying my meal because it is lasagna, and I know that 1 like lasagna." Alternatively, people 
may simply taste the food and answer on the basis of the on-line experience of pleasure 
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or displeasure. In other words, they may use their affect directly as information, rather than 
indirectly as a cue to retrieve stored knowledge about one's likes. 
When Is Affect Used as Information? Isbell and colleagues (Isbell & Wyer, 1999; Ottati 
& Isbell, 1996) found mood effects on liking for stimulus persons described as political 
candidates. However, these effects occurred mainly when judges were not well informed about 
politics. For those high in political expertise, happy moods led to lower, rather than higher, 
evaluations of candidates, suggesting that they corrected their judgments for the influence of 
feelings and relied instead on their expertise. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that 
affect plays a role only in the attitudes of novices. Lodge and Taber (2004) note that affect 
actually plays a larger role in the judgments of politically sophisticated individuals because 
politically relevant stimuli are more likely to elicit affect in them. Thus, when affect is from an 
irrelevant source, such as induced moods (e.g., Ottati & Isbell, 1996), we should expect less 
influence of affect, whereas when the affect stems from the attitude object itself, we might expect 
more affect and hence more effect with greater sophistication (Lodge & Taber, 2004). 
Forgas (1995) concurs that affect should have no influence on judgment when prior judg-
ments can be retrieved. His affect infusion model differentiates situations into those that are 
"open" versus "closed" and that involve high versus low effort. It says that mood should have an 
influence in "open," but not "closed" situations. A "closed" situation is one in which a 
specific answer already exists in memory or is dictated by motivation. An "open" situation 
involves some amount of processing, which can be either heuristic (low effort) or substantive 
(high effort). Forgas categorizes the affect-as-information approach (Clore, Schwarz, & 
Conway, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1983) as low effort or heuristic, and the memory-based 
approach (Forgas & Bower, 1987) as high effort or substantive. 
An Affect Heuristic. The idea of a "How do I feel about it?" heuristic was proposed in 
Schwarz and Clore (1988), who suggested that use of the heuristic is likely when little other 
information is available and when time constraints put a premium on attentional resources. 
Since then, Slovic and colleagues (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002) have also 
proposed an "affect heuristic." 
The idea that affect is used as a heuristic suggests that mood effects should be found 
mainly when judgments are made quickly. However, Forgas (1995) reports greater mood 
effects on tasks that take longer, providing evidence for two kinds of mood effects, one that is a 
heuristic shortcut, and another that involves more effortful, substantive processing. But for 
many judgments, asking oneself how one feels about an object is not a shortcut, but is the most 
relevant data to be considered. Indeed, even in choices that are backed up by considerable 
research, one may still ask how the tentative decision feels. If it does not feel right, good 
decision makers may go back to the drawing board. 
Affective Bias? Investigators of judgment and decision making tend to see affective 
influences on judgment as biases. Such language assumes that pure, unbiased judgments would 
not involve affect. But we assume that affect did not evolve to conflict with common sense. 
Indeed, work on emotional intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1997) suggests that it is important for 
judgments to be informed by emotion. Damasio (1994) arrives at similar conclusions from 
studies of patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex. He argues that the poor judgment 
among these individuals does not result from deficits in intelligence, but from deficits in their 
ability to use affective reactions as feedback. 
Alternative Affective Representations 
Investigations of affective influences often focus on mood or other affective feelings. However, 
other forms of affective information appear to have similar influences. For example, evidence 
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(Clore & Colcombe, 2003) suggests that without necessarily changing people's moods, un-
consciously primed affective thoughts can have the same cognitive consequences as affective 
feelings of mood. The same also appears to be true of facial expressions (Schnall & Clore, 
2002; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988), and even colors (Soldat, & Sinclair, 2001). Although 
unconscious priming, posed expressions, and related stimuli can affect mood under certain 
circumstances, it is also useful to entertain a broader view, recognizing that multiple represen-
tations of affective meaning can each have similar effects. 
According to Clore and Colcombe (2003), parallel effects can be expected for mood, un-
consciously primed evaluative concepts, feedback from facial expressions, and perhaps other 
affectively meaningful cues to the extent that they all convey information about goodness or 
badness. Indeed, even in studies of felt mood, according to the affect-as-information approach, it is not 
the feelings per se that are important but their information value. What is critical for affective 
information to influence judgment is that it is experienced as compelling by virtue of seeming to 
arise spontaneously from within. The spontaneity and compellingness of the evaluative information 
is more important than whether the medium of the information is facial muscles, motor action, 
visceral feelings, or thoughts. We have argued that the influence of affective feedback on 
judgment and processing is not limited to feelings, but that affective, information can be 
represented in multiple media. 
Affect in Attitudes Toward Actions 
Complementing research on affect and judgment is theorizing about affect and decision making. 
From an attitude framework, we might think of affective influences on decision making as 
influences of affect on attitudes toward actions (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
Risk-as-Feeling. Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001) have proposed a risk-as-
feeling model. They suggest that feelings often constitute a major component in decision 
making processes, and lead to decisions that are primarily made on the basis of feelings rather 
than cognitive processes. In particular, risky decisions are often governed by fear and anxiety that 
work independently of cognitive considerations of risks. Decision-relevant feelings might come 
from vividly imagined consequences of a decision, and from personal experiences or 
familiarity of the consequences of making a decision. For example, Loewenstein et al. (2001) 
consider the case of deciding whether or not to get insurance against floods or earthquakes. Most 
people are likely to overestimate the occurrence of such adverse events when confronted with 
anecdotal reports, rather than actual probabilities of floods and earthquakes. Thus, personally 
knowing somebody who witnessed an earthquake, and the resulting fear of the same event 
happening to oneself, can override other pieces of information, and lead to decisions that 
neglect cognitive factors. Loewenstein et al. refer to their model as dealing with "anticipatory" 
emotion: feelings experienced while the decision is being pondered. In contrast, "anticipated" 
affect comes into the picture when considering the emotional implications of having made a 
certain decision. 
Affect Decision Theory. A model that deals with such anticipated emotion is the affect 
decision theory proposed by Mellers, Schwartz, Ho and Ritov (1997). These authors argue that a 
person's expectation about an outcome has important consequences on the emotional response 
to that outcome. In their research, participants were given certain expectations about the amount 
of money they would win or lose in a gamble, and these expectations were either confirmed or 
violated. The results indicated that affective responses were not a linear function of the 
absolute amount of money. A greater win was not necessarily perceived as more pleasant than 
a smaller win. Instead, the amount of the win interacted with the participant's 
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expectation of the win: Unexpected wins were experienced as more pleasant than expected 
wins. Participants engaged in counterfactual reasoning so that they considered not only what 
actually happened, but what could have happened. As noted by Mellers et al., this reasoning led to 
the counterintuitive finding that an unexpected win of $5.40 produced more positive affect than 
an expected win of $9.70. Thus, expectations about predicted outcomes form the basis for 
counterfactual comparisons so that certain wins lead to disappointment, whereas certain losses 
lead to relief. 
Specific Emotions and Attitude 
Thus far, we have focused on the role of positive and negative affect in positive and negative 
attitudes. But some investigators have begun to examine specific emotions (Lerner, Small, & 
Loewenstein, 2004). For example, DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, and Cajdric (2004) focused on 
anger. They proposed that anger should influence automatic evaluations of outgroups because of 
its functional relevance to intergroup conflict and competition, whereas other negative emotions 
that are less relevant to intergroup relations (e.g., sadness) should not. In two experiments, they 
created minimal ingroups and outgroups. The minimal groups situation involved asking New 
Yorkers to estimate "How many people ride the New York subway everyday?" Participants were 
then told (on a random basis) whether they were an under- or an over-estimator. Experimenters 
gave red wristbands to the underestimators and blue wristbands to the overestimators. They then 
induced anger, sadness, or a neutral state. Automatic attitudes toward the in- and outgroups were 
assessed using pictures in an evaluative priming measure (Experiment 1) and the Implicit 
Association Test (Experiment 2). The results showed that anger created automatic prejudice toward 
the outgroup, whereas sadness and neutrality resulted in no automatic intergroup bias. 
Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) also examined the role of specific emotions in attitudes 
toward outgroups. They proposed that emotions such as fear are characterized by different 
action tendencies than emotions such as anger. They proposed that groups that are feared 
should be avoided, whereas groups responded to with anger may elicit an aggressive stance. In 
three experiments, they found evidence that people had different inclinations toward outgroups to 
which they felt fear as opposed to anger. When the ingroup was strong (enjoyed collective 
support of group members), people were more willing to entertain such actions as arguing with, 
confronting, opposing, and attacking the outgroup. Moreover, they found that the relation 
between appraisal of group strength and offensive action tendencies was mediated by self-
reported anger. 
In addition to specificity of behavioral inclinations, some attitudes may also involve specificity 
in the kind of evaluation involved. For example, Haidt (2001) has proposed an emotion-based 
account of what might be thought of as moral attitudes. He argues that many of our moral 
evaluations are based on disgust or other emotional reactions. In his view, moral reasoning of the 
sort studied by Kohlberg (1969) may often be after-the-fact justifications for moral judgments, 
rather than causes of them. For example, in what he calls demonstrations of "moral 
dumbfounding," Haidt asked students to consider such scenarios as one involving consensual sex 
between a brother and sister. The students tend to find such actions morally objectionable. 
However, when asked why, their reasons are often insubstantial and faltering, leading some to say 
essentially, "I don't know why, it is just disgusting." He suggests that what may appear to be a 
lack of insight may actually be an accurate account of the emotional basis of moral attitudes. 
In the foregoing sections, we have discussed in some depth the many ways in which affective 
valence may influence attitudinal valence. Before leaving this discussion of the direct influences of 
affect on attitude, we consider the role played by the other major facet of affect-arousal. 
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Arousal as Importance 
Affective feelings are evanescent. One does not store feelings in memory; they last only as long as they are being 
experienced, and no longer. Of course, a person might remember the fact that he or she was happy on some 
occasion, but one cannot look into memory and find the happy feelings. One can even mentally replay an emotional 
event, and elicit feelings, but those are new feelings, not memories of the original ones. Long ago, Bartlett (1932) 
showed that we do not store experiences as experiences, but rather that we reconstruct them later. The same is true of 
visceral feelings (Loewenstein, 1996), including emotions (Wyer et al., 1999). If so, how can momentary affect 
become attitudes, which are not necessarily momentary? 
One answer may lie in the arousal aspect of affect. The arousal aspect of affect conveys information about 
urgency and importance (Fig. 11.1), and that embodiment of importance makes events memorable. Indeed, recent 
research on the neuroscience of memory shows how the adrenaline elicited during affective experience acts to 
consolidate memory for those events over time (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998). Presumably, a psychologically important 
event is one that may be affectively arousing, and that arousal makes it more memorable. If so, similar 
subsequent events may remind one of that event and elicit related affective reactions experienced as an affective 
attitude. 
William James (1890) said that, "If we remembered everything, we should on most occasions be as ill off as if 
we remembered nothing." The key, he suggested, lies in selecting what to remember. One hundred years later, it is 
becoming clearer that emotion helps us in selecting what is important to remember. 
Memory is generally thought of as divided into short-term and long-term memory, and "memory 
consolidation" refers to the process by which memories get transferred from the short-term to the long-term store. 
This is where emotion comes in. The brain has to decide what is worth retaining from all of the experiences that 
pass through short-term memory. We can try to make something more memorable by consciously attending to it or by 
practicing it. But when an event triggers the release of adrenaline, we will remember it even without trying to. As 
things get emotional, the stress hormone adrenaline stimulates the amygdala, which tags the experience as important 
for storage in other areas of the brain. 
Arousal appears to be a way to give information preferential weighting for storage. Thus, the most 
important experiences result in the strongest memories. Moreover, since it is the arousal rather than the valence of 
an experience that matters, it can make both good news and bad news more memorable. 
The primary work on arousal and memory has been done by McGaugh and colleagues (Cahill & McGaugh, 
1998). For example, one study showed that a series of emotionally evocative film clips were better recalled than a 
series of neutral clips taken from the same films (Cahill et al., 1996). The emotional clips depicted themes of 
animal mutilation or violent crime, whereas the neutral clips were similar in style, but less emotionally arousing, 
including scenes of court proceedings, travel, and so on. 
Students watched the films while glucose utilization in the brain was measured by positron emission 
tomography (PET). Three weeks later they were contacted by telephone and asked to recall the film clips. The results 
showed that mean activity in the amygdala showed a clear relationship to later mean recall of the emotional clips, 
but not of the nonemotional clips. Thus, amygdala activity during emotional experiences is related to long-term, 
conscious recall of those experiences, but such amygdala activity is not relevant to recall of nonemotional 
situations. 
These findings support the view that although neutral experiences can be remembered without involvement of 
stress hormones or amygdala activation, when one is emotionally aroused, stress hormones stimulate the amygdala to 
influence storage of that material in memory. 
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Irrelevant Arousal Is Also Effective. As it happens, arousal-induced memory en-
hancement can occur even when the source of the arousal is irrelevant, and even if it comes 
after learning has already taken place. For example, Nielson (2003) found such effects when 
she showed an arousing film after people memorized a list of words such as fire, queen, and 
butterfly (see also Pearson, 2002). Half of the participants watched a film of a dentist pulling a 
tooth, complete with blood and screeching drill. Twenty-four hours later, these traumatized 
participants' memory for the list was about 10% better than the memory of participants who 
watched a dull film about tooth brushing. Apparently even if the material is not personally 
meaningful, emotion can aid memory. 
We have long known that emotionally charged events are easier to remember. Psychologists 
have usually assumed that this occurs because people focus more on emotional events or 
because they essentially engage in more practice of emotional events as they ruminate about 
them. Now, it appears that adrenaline does the work, by activating the amygdala, which signals the 
hippocampus, which helps decide what to remember. These results are consistent with animal 
data showing that memory can be enhanced by administering adrenalin shortly after aversive 
training at the time that it would normally have been released by aversive stimulation. It thus 
appears that, "Long-term memories are not made instantaneously: they consolidate over time after 
learning (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998, p. 294)." 
Arousal Can Hinder as Well as Help. It should be noted, however, that arousal can 
interfere with memory, as well as enhance it. The dose-response curve for adrenaline is an 
inverted U, so that either too much or too little adrenaline does not improve memory. We may fail 
to remember either mundane events or events accompanied by truly extreme emotion, but in 
general, strong emotion yields strong memories. 
Implications. What are the implications of these discoveries about emotion and memory for 
the establishment of attitude? LeDoux (1996) has suggested that "emotion is memory." In other 
words, he thinks of an emotion that is triggered in some situation as an embodied memory of the 
significance of such situations. If so, then it may be equally sensible to say that "attitude is 
memory" (at least for attitudes originating in personal affective experience). The research to date, 
however, has not focused on whether emotion during an experience makes the emotional 
significance, as opposed to making the situational details, memorable. 
From research in which volunteers watched a grim film of a rabbit-processing factory, Cahill 
found that the more viewers ruminated over the next two days on what they had seen, they more 
they could remember. He suggests that replaying a memory reelicits adrenaline and reactivates the 
amygdala (Pearson, 2002). Indeed, some (Pittman, 1989) suggest that the problem in cases of 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is that in addition to the memorability of the original 
trauma, each time it is remembered, new arousal further increases its memorability until the 
memory becomes disabling. 
To the extent that the remembered details support the ability of a situation to reelicit emotion, 
then the processes we have discussed may be important in transforming momentary emotional 
experiences into attitudes. On the other hand, mood research suggests that the generality of 
affective influences may depend specifically on forgetting about the details of the situation in 
which the affect originated (Keltner et al., 1993). Jacobs and Nadel (1985) too say that old 
phobias recur when the activity of the hippocampus, which is responsible for situating 
memories, is dampened. Under such conditions the emotional significance of experience with the 
phobic object becomes unconstrained by the time and place of its original occurrence. Thus, 
stereotyped and persistent reactions may be elicited that are not constrained by an 
appropriate context in memory. And similar spreading of fearful reactions can occur over time as 
animals forget the aspects of the environment that served as safety signals (Hendersen, 
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1978). Thus, to develop a generic attitude may require that the affect become attached to 
some attribute of the stimulus object divorced from a particular time and place. It is possible, 
therefore, that remembering well the situational details of emotional moments would limit or 
constrain emotional memories to be relevant only to that situation, thus inhibiting production of a 
generalized attitude. On the other hand, well remembered situations should have a greater 
capacity to elicit an emotional and attitudinal response. 
Summary of Direct Effects 
This large segment covers the direct influences of affect on attitude, including, most notably, 
classical conditioning. The idea of reducing complex phenomena to simple reflexes dates at 
least to Descartes, who envisioned explanations based on behavioral reflexes that were as 
automatic as the physical reflections of light from mirrors. 
Classical Conditioning. We reviewed classic studies of attitude conditioning (Razran, 
1954; Watson & Raynor, 1920; Staats & Staats, 1958), as well as recent ones (Olson & Fazio, 
2001). However, some investigators (Baeyens et al., 1992; DeHouwer et al., 2001) suggest 
that the simple affective associations involved in attitude development do not fit the Pavlovian 
conditioning mold. Pavlovian conditioning, on the one hand, involves expectations about the 
occurrence of an event (UCS), awareness of event contingency, and extinction of expectancies 
when the conditioned stimulus is no longer followed by such events. The simple associations 
involved in affect and attitude, on the other hand, do not depend on expectations of events, do 
not appear to require awareness, and do not show extinction effects. In these respects, such 
associations may be more like impression formation than like conditioned responding. 
Narrative Coherence. We suggested that a single gestalt principle may underlie various 
phenomena, including affective conditioning or association, affective priming, and mood effects 
on judgment. In all of these, succeeding moments of experience tend to form perceptual groupings. 
This automatic process of linking successive experiences together is presumably also 
responsible for the narrative coherence that makes everyday experiences meaningful. 
Limitations to Conditioning Models. An additional limitation of classical conditioning 
as a paradigm for attitude development is the implication that the relevant associations are random 
and haphazard. This criticism was anticipated even during the Enlightenment by critics of 
associationism (Sutton, 1998). Modern research suggests that we are evolutionarily prepared 
(Seligman, 1970) to learn particular kinds of responses to particular classes of stimuli, as is 
evident in phenomena such as the Garcia effect (Garcia & Koelling, 1966). In addition, certain 
things become associated with affect not haphazardly or by conditioning, but because we are 
cognitively or culturally prepared to associate them (as components of structured knowledge 
and cultural assumptions). As a further counterpoint to associationistic explanations, we 
discussed how theory of mind provides a social and cognitive account of how children learn 
affective meaning (Bloom, 2000). Finally, we emphasized that objects may also simply inherit the 
affective reactions to the groups or categories to which they are seen to belong (Fiske, 1982). 
Mere Exposure. We next turned to studies of mere exposure (Zajonc, 1968; 2001), the 
observation that increased exposure to novel stimuli increases liking. The effect is greatest 
when people are unaware of the prior exposures (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980), interpreted 
initially as evidence that affect can be processed prior to and independently of cognition. 
Critics emphasized that since most cognitive processing takes place outside of awareness, 
lack of awareness does not imply lack of cognition. Others offered cognitive interpretations in 
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terms of familiarity and fluency of processing (e.g., Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992). Recent 
evidence (Winkielman et al., 2003) suggests, however, that cognitive fluency (in the context of 
goals to understand) elicits positive affect, which in turn elicits liking. Thus, mere exposure is an 
affective phenomenon, but not one that bypasses ordinary cognitive processing. 
Mood and Judgment. Research on mood and judgment was a final example of direct 
influences of affect. As with mere exposure, induced affect from mood influences judgment 
mainly when its source is not obvious. Clear demonstrations of affect in attitude involved in-
ducing mood independently of beliefs in research on interpersonal attraction (Gouaux, 1971; 
Griffitt & Veitch, 1971). Early explanations reconciled these observations with traditional 
notions that judgments depend on beliefs. Theorists (Bower et al., 1978; Isen et al., 1978) 
proposed that affect served to activate cognitive material in memory-the real bases for judg-
ment. Others (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) proposed that affect itself can act as information about the 
value of attitude objects. According to the affect-as-information approach, judgments are 
sometimes made by (implicitly) asking, "How do I feel about it?" (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). 
Although sometimes called a judgment "heuristic" (Slovic et al., 2002), others note that affective 
influences need not be viewed as shortcuts (Forgas, 1995; Wyer et al., 1999), nor as sources of 
"bias" to be overcome (Ketelaar & Clore, 1997; Damasio, 1994; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). 
We noted that sources of affective information other than mood show mood-like effects on 
judgment and information processing. To the extent that expressions, colors, and subliminal 
primes also provide compelling information about value, they should function the same as 
mood regardless of whether or not they induce mood. 
Attitude Toward Action. Affect can also influence attitudes toward actions, as seen in 
hypotheses aimed at explaining affect in decision making. These include both risk-as-feeling 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001) and affect decision theory (Mellers et al., 1997). In addition, research is 
increasingly focused on the role of specific emotions such as disgust (Lerner et al., 2004) and 
anger (DeSteno et al., 2004). Mackie et al. (2000), for example, suggest that outgroups 
eliciting anger may incline people toward aggression, whereas those eliciting fear may simply be 
avoided. 
Arousal and Memory. Finally, research on long term memory for arousing events (Cahill 
& McGaugh, 1998) suggests that the arousal component of affect may also be important for 
attitude formation. We ended this section by asking whether remembering well the details of 
emotional moments would establish or limit the establishment of general attitudes. 
Although affect has many direct influences on attitude, as described in this section, there 
are also indirect influences that are important. We turn to these indirect influences now. 
Indirect Influence of Affect on Attitudes 
When people focus directly on attitude objects with the goal of evaluating them, then positive 
and negative affective cues are likely to be experienced as manifestations of liking and disliking. 
This represents a direct effect on attitude. But in task situations when people focus on their own 
expectations and inclinations to respond and have a performance goal, then the same affective 
cues may be experienced as information about their own efficacy, rather than as liking. In such 
situations, individuals who feel efficacious (by virtue of being in a happy mood) tend to rely on 
cognitively accessible information, such as stereotypes, whereas those who do not (by virtue of 
being in a sad mood) tend to focus on individuating information. In this way, affect may have an 
indirect effect on attitude, for example, by governing whether people rely on categorical or 
individuating information (Fiedler, 1988; Schwarz, 1990). 
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Affect and Stereotyping 
Few areas of social psychology have received as much attention in the past decade as stereo-
typing. A thorough review is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, two salient points in 
this literature are relevant to a treatment of affect and attitude. The first is the development 
during the 1990s of a dual process view of stereotyping (Devine, 1989). The second is research on 
affective triggers for stereotyping (Bodenhausen, 1993). 
The idea that stereotyping follows naturally as a response to ethnic labeling was explicit in 
Allport's (1954) initial writing on the topic, as was the idea that people sometimes put the 
brakes on their prejudices. Thus, in a sense Allport also anticipated the current dual-process 
view of stereotyping. In the meantime, some social psychologists also have treated stereotype 
activation as an automatic consequence of intergroup contact. But these same investigators 
have often emphasized that people can and do control such automatic stereotyping (Brewer, 
1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; for a review see Devine & Montieth, 1999). 
Interestingly, these treatments of stereotyping have tended to take emotion out of stereotyping. 
Rather than assuming that the impulse to stereotype ethnic minorities results from deep seated 
anger, which motivates displacement and scapegoating (Dollard & Miller, 1950), this view sees 
stereotyping as just another instance of cognitive categorization. Recent work using the IAT has 
also contributed to the idea that ethnic stereotypes are part of most people's world knowledge 
and stereotypic names and labels tend to activate such knowledge even among minority group 
members. 
Despite the fact that the existence of stereotypes may not implicate emotion, some research 
does suggest that affect plays a role in the use of stereotypes in judgments and decisions. 
Specifically, studies of mood and processing show that stereotypes are more likely to be used 
when individuals are in happy than in sad moods. 
Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer (1994) asked participants induced to be happy and sad to 
act as jurors. Before reading about the crime, participants read the target's name and home 
town, which identified him in half of the cases as Hispanic. This identification was intended to 
activate a stereotype, and the research examined when this information would and would not 
be used in judgments of guilt. They found that the stereotype had more impact on the 
judgments of jurors in happy, rather than in sad, moods. 
The research shows clearly that affective cues can play a role in the use of stereotypes. 
However, the role played by affect is not unique to stereotyping. Indeed, happy mood appears to 
have the same influence on the use of any categorical information. For example, Bless and 
colleagues (Bless et al., 1996) examined the role of mood in people's use of scripts (schemas 
about action sequences) to process information from stories. In a recognition task, they found 
that individuals in happy moods made more script-consistent errors. That is, they falsely 
recognized information that they had not actually heard, but which was consistent with the 
restaurant script they had used to encode the story. 
Additional findings in the study by Bless et al. (1996) help explain why happy mood 
increases reliance on stereotypes, scripts, and other general knowledge structures. Older ex-
planations had assumed that individuals in happy moods might be sufficiently preoccupied 
that they had limited attentional resources for systematic processing (Worth & Mackie, 1987). Or 
perhaps positive feelings implied that systematic processing was unnecessary (Schwarz, 
1990). To test these explanations, Bless et al. (1996) included a secondary task as partic-
ipants listened to the story. They found that participants in happy moods did not lack the 
ability or motivation for systematic processing. In fact, they performed better than those in sad 
moods on the secondary task. Instead, it appeared that their reliance on the restaurant script 
to process the story left them with extra attentional resources for doing the secondary task. 
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The greater use of the accessible cognitions on the part of happy mood participants suggests 
that in task situations positive affect serves as efficacy feedback (Clore et al., 2001). That is, 
positive affective cues provide a green light for relying on expectations, inclinations, and 
accessible cognitions. They confer value on the processor's own constructive efforts (Fiedler, 
2001) and cue a relational orientation, in which people process incoming information in relation to 
accessible cognitions and general knowledge structures (Bless & Fiedler, 1995). Negative affect 
serves as a stop sign that tends to reduce reliance on accessible cognitions and increases reliance 
on external information in the environment. 
Subsequent research by Isbell (1999, 2004) has provided further evidence for an affect-as-
information interpretation of mood and stereotyping results. In a series of studies, her 
participants read one of a series of narratives in which a character engages in behaviors, some of 
which imply one stereotype and some of which imply another. Beforehand, they were given an 
expectation intended to cue one of the two stereotypes. For example, the character in the story 
was described either as an introverted librarian or an extraverted salesperson. When she asked 
later for ratings of the character, she consistently found that individuals in happy, but not those 
in sad moods, used their initial expectations and activated stereotypes. Her results were thus 
consistent with those of Bodenhausen et al. (1994). 
Attribution. As a test of the affect-as-information interpretation, Isbell (2004) also in-
troduced an attribution manipulation. Participants rated how the writing task, which had been 
used as a method of mood induction, had made them feel. This process made salient the true 
cause of their positive or negative affective feelings. Once their true cause became salient, these 
irrelevant feelings were no longer experienced as feedback about the value of their accessible 
cognitions. As predicted, the results were reversed for individuals in the attribution groups, so 
that sad but not happy individuals now relied on the activated stereotype. Why do attribution 
manipulations not simply eliminate mood effects? Presumably, reversals occur because 
ordinary processing already involves both top-down and bottom-up processing. Inhibiting the 
kind of processing style encouraged by their now discounted feelings leaves only the opposing 
tendency, resulting in reversed results in which sad mood individuals now use stereotypes and 
happy mood individuals do not. 
In addition to her attribution results, in other versions of the same paradigm, Isbell also asked 
her participants to recall the story they had heard. She found, as expected, that individuals in 
happy moods recalled significantly more stereotype-inconsistent behaviors from the story. 
Consistent with the prior person memory literature (Wyer & Srull, 1989), increased schema-
inconsistent recall is a clear indication that individuals in happy moods were actively using the 
accessible stereotype to process the story. That is, behaviors that do not fit the stereotype tended 
to stick out and received more practice, leading to greater recall. 
Anger. One further surprising but important fact about mood and stereotyping concerns the 
effects of anger. Bodenhausen at al. (1994) manipulated anger in addition to happy and sad mood. 
He found that responses of participants in angry moods showed that they also relied on 
stereotypes. Thus, happy and angry mood led to the same results, even though happy is 
considered a positive emotion and anger a negative emotion. But the affect-as-information 
hypothesis concerning mood effects on processing maintains that the nature of affective influences 
should depend on the information conveyed by the affect in that situation. If feelings of anger 
(like positive affective feelings) are experienced as information that one's own position is 
correct, then it is not surprising that in angry, as well as in happy moods, people rely on 
accessible cognitions, including stereotypes. Tiedens and Linton (2001) also provide evidence that 
emotions associated with certainty (e.g., disgust) promote heuristic processing, whereas 
emotions associated with uncertainty (e.g., fear) promote systematic processing. 
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Egalitarian Goals. Most research on mood and stereotyping concerns the tendency for 
individuals in happy or angry moods, but not in sad moods, to use stereotypes. According to the 
affect-as-information approach, however, this result occurs because stereotypes are fairly 
accessible for most people (at least in the usual experimental situations studied). But what if 
the people studied were chronic egalitarians? Would positive mood make chronic egalitarians 
stereotype less? Dunn and Clore (2004) tested this hypothesis with participants who possessed a 
chronic goal to treat women in an egalitarian fashion. Following the approach used by 
Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, and Schaal (1999), they first asked men to rate women as a 
group on various gender-stereotypical attributes. Next, participants completed a survey that 
forced them to endorse stereotypical statements about women. Finally, they were again asked to 
rate women on stereotypical attributes. The idea is that people with egalitarian goals who have 
been forced to endorse stereotypical statements should compensate by describing women in 
counter-stereotypical ways at the next opportunity. Thus, participants who rated women as 
substantially less stereotypic on the final survey than the initial survey were classified as 
"chronic egalitarians." 
A week later, they first listened to happy or sad music to induce mood and then completed a 
lexical decision task involving a series of pictures and letter strings. On each trial, a picture of a 
male or female appeared followed by a stereotypically female word, a gender-neutral word, or a 
nonword. Stereotype activation was measured by the degree to which pictures of women 
facilitated detection of stereotypically female words. 
Consistent with previous research, they found that non-chronic egalitarians exhibited greater 
stereotyping on the lexical decision task in happy, rather than in sad, moods. In contrast, chronic 
egalitarians exhibited the opposite pattern, showing greater stereotyping in sad, rather than in 
happy, moods. This finding indicates that rather than exerting a direct influence on stereo-
typing, positive affect simply influences reliance on accessible strategies of social perception. For 
people who typically avoid stereotyping, happy moods apparently minimize rather than 
promote stereotypical thinking. 
Category-Triggered Affect. In the first section of the chapter, we discussed Fiske's work 
on schema-triggered affect. We noted that Fiske and Pavelchek (1986) proposed a theory 
concerning when one would focus on categorical information and when one would focus on 
individuating information. That work predated the research on mood and stereotyping, which 
implies that affect is one of the important conditions determining whether people focus on 
categorical or individuating information. As in the case of stereotyping, whether or not the 
affective reactions to individuals are dictated by affective reactions to their group depends on 
whether perceivers focus on their group identity or individual identity. That, in turn, appears to 
depend partly on mood. 
This tendency for certain emotions to foster the use of stereotypes when accessible does 
not imply that happy or angry individuals would be more likely to form stereotypes in the 
first place. For example, happy and sad mood participants show no greater tendency to include 
stereotypic attributes in lists of characteristics of various ethnic groups (Esses & Zanna, 1995). 
Also, within the illusory correlation paradigm, both happy and sad mood inductions have been 
found to disrupt both the formation of illusory stereotypes (Hamilton, Stroessner, & Mackie, 
1993) and accurate judgments of the variability of individuals within groups (Stroessner & 
Mackie, 1992). 
Brand Names. We noted earlier that reliance on brand names in the consumer domain may 
operate somewhat like stereotyping. In line with such an interpretation, Adaval (2001) 
examined influences of mood on intentions to buy various products, including sneakers and 
jeans. She provided information about both brand names (e.g., Levi's vs. Rustler) and product 
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quality (e.g., high vs. low quality workmanship). She found that variation in the favorability of the 
brands had significantly more impact on the decisions of individuals in happy moods than on 
decisions of those in sad moods. Thus, regardless of the kind of attitude object, positive affect 
appears to promote a tendency to focus on global, categorical information, whereas in negative 
states, individuals focus more on individuating details. 
Party Identification. In a related vein, some observations suggest that voters in positive 
moods are also more likely to rely on the party identification of candidates. Consistent with 
the insights from mood research, Marcus and MacKuen (1993) show that anxiety inhibits 
reliance on predispositions such as partisan identification and ideological conviction, making 
voters learn more about issues and candidates. Instead of voting on the basis of category-
level information, anxious voters rely on more individuated information (Marcus, Neuman, & 
MacKuen, 2000). This process lays the groundwork for change from habitual voting patterns. 
For example, in the 1988 presidential election, Republican attacks made Democrats more 
anxious about their candidate, opening up the possibility of defection of Democratic voters. 
Such defections often hold the key factor in elections (e.g., Clinton Republicans in 1996 and 
Reagan Democrats in 1984). Marcus suggests (personal communication, March 2, 2004) that 
who gets anxious is also a key factor. For example, when things go bad in Iraq or in the economy 
during a Republican administration, Republican voters would be more likely to get anxious 
than Democrats. 
Summary. When associated with attitude objects, positive affect may be experienced as 
liking. But during task performance, it may be experienced as efficacy (Clore et al., 2001) or 
fluency (Mackie & Smith, 2002). In turn, such positive feedback should lead to the confident use 
of accessible cognitions, including stereotypes. Indeed, Bodenhausen et al. (1994) showed greater 
stereotype use in happy than in sad moods. We emphasized an affect-as-information 
interpretation of mood effects on stereotyping. Consistent with that view, Isbell (2003) showed 
that the effect could be reversed by changing attributions. Also consistent are findings of 
increased stereotype use for other emotions that implicate either confidence in one's own view, 
including anger (Bodenhausen et al., 1994) and disgust (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Finally, 
that stereotype accessibility is the key can be seen from research showing that individuals for 
whom egalitarianism is accessible show less rather than more stereotype use in happy moods 
(Dunn & Clore, 2004). 
Stereotype use was seen as part of a general tendency to adopt a category-level focus (Fiske & 
Pavelchek, 1986; Gasper & Clore, 2002) when positive affect empowers current thoughts. 
Applications of this idea can be seen in related affective influences on attention to brand names as 
opposed to product attributes by consumers (Adaval, 2001) and political party identification as 
opposed to specific candidate attributes among voters (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). A second kind 
of indirect influence, to which we turn next, concerns the role of affect in determining whether 
individuals scrutinize persuasive arguments or tend to accept them as presented. 
Affect and Persuasion 
As discussed extensively by Johnson, Maio, and Smith-McLallen (this volume), two basic 
ways of processing persuasive messages have been identified (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 
1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). One way is to focus on the actual content of a persuasive 
message, and to scrutinize the message content with regard to the quality of its arguments. 
This strategy of dealing with persuasive messages has been termed "central" (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986) or "systematic" (Chaiken et al., 1989) processing. In contrast, "peripheral" or "heuristic" 
processing involves disregarding the content of the message, focusing instead on additional 
cues irrelevant to the actual content, such as the source of the information or the status or the 
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expertise of the person conveying it. As a consequence of the different routes of processing, 
when participants use the central/systematic route of responding to message content, they 
tend to be persuaded more by strong arguments, and less by weak arguments. However, the 
strength of the argument matters less when the peripheral route is chosen. In that case, other 
"peripheral" factors, such as the credibility of the source of the message or the intention of the 
communicator become important in the persuasive process. 
The model assumes also that the same information can be processed in either or both a central or 
a peripheral manner (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). For example, the attractiveness of a woman 
advertising beauty products could either be a relevant cue, indicating that the beauty products 
work, or an irrelevant cue, consisting of positive affective reactions to her beauty that become 
associated with the product. The model thus emphasizes that multiple roles can be played by 
particular factors. The influence of mood or extraneous affect is an example of a factor that can 
either be relevant or irrelevant. For example, the positive feelings of a person processing the 
proposals of a political candidate may act as a valid argument, whereas the positive feelings 
from hearing the "Star-Spangled Banner" in the background may act as an irrelevant cue, rather 
than a valid argument. Indeed, a whole literature has been generated investigating the effects of 
mood on persuasion (for reviews, see Mackie, Ascuncion, & Rosselli, 1992; Schwarz, Bless, & 
Bohner, 1991; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
Persuasion and Affective States. One robust finding is that in happy moods, people are 
persuaded equally by strong and weak arguments, whereas in sad moods, people are 
persuaded more by strong, and less by weak arguments (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 
1990; Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Sinclair, Mark, & Clore, 
1994; Worth & Mackie, 1987). For example, Bless et al. (1990) induced moods by having 
students contemplate a pleasant or an unpleasant event from their own lives. Participants then 
considered strong or weak arguments supporting an increase in student services fees at their 
university. A positive mood resulted in a propensity to use the peripheral route, by paying little 
attention to the message content, such as the quality of arguments. In contrast, participants in 
the negative mood condition were persuaded only by strong arguments; presumably, they paid 
more attention to argument content and elaborated on it more. 
However, these effects were malleable: When they were distracted by a secondary task, 
people in negative moods elaborated less, and in fact, performed much like participants in 
happy moods (Bless et al., 1990). In contrast, participants in happy moods showed no effects of 
the distracter task, suggesting that they did not engage in elaborative processing in the first 
place. Further, when given explicit instructions to evaluate argument quality, happy mood 
participants were persuaded only by strong arguments, an indication that they were able to 
engage in elaborative processing when explicitly asked to do so (Bless et al., 1990). 
Several explanations have been offered for the effects of moods on persuasion (for an 
extensive discussion of this issue, see Bless & Schwarz, 1999). The findings described above 
were initially interpreted by Bless and colleagues (1990) as indicating that when in a happy 
mood, people are simply not motivated to pursue effortful processing, and instead, rely on less 
demanding styles of processing. Since this deficit can be overcome by specific instructions, 
it does not reflect a deficit in cognitive capacity, as suggested by others (Mackie & Worth, 
1989). The cognitive capacity hypothesis postulates that because positive mood states activate 
large amounts of connected positive content in memory (Isen, 1987), cognitive resources are 
not available for systematic elaboration of the message content for individuals experiencing 
a positive mood (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987). Support for this position 
comes from the finding that when participants in happy moods were given additional time to 
elaborate message content, the effects of positive mood on persuasion were eliminated (Mackie 
& Worth, 1989). , 
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However, several empirical findings are inconsistent with a cognitive capacity account. It has 
also been suggested that negative mood states (rather than positive ones) limit cognitive 
processing capacity (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). Further, if participants experiencing positive 
moods are indeed unable to engage in elaborative processing, instructions should not make a 
difference, but they did in the studies reported by Bless et al. (1990). In addition, investigators 
(Isen, 1987) have repeatedly found that happy moods in fact lead to better performance, relative to 
neutral or sad moods, for example, on creative problem solving tasks. A series of experiments that 
is particularly instructive in this context was reported by Bless and colleagues (Bless et al., 1996). 
They found that, compared to sad or neutral moods, happy moods increased reliance on script-
based information, which led to better rather than worse performance on a secondary task. Thus, 
positive mood did not compromise performance, as would be expected according to limited 
capacity accounts. 
Although in earlier work they argued for a motivational explanation of mood on persuasion 
(Bless et al., 1990), in later accounts, Bless and Schwarz (1999) rephrased their position as 
reflecting reliance on "general knowledge structures" that can function independently of 
motivational or cognitive capacity constraints. For example, as noted by Bless and colleagues 
(1996), in some situations, happy individuals actually outperform individuals in sad or neutral 
moods, because they can use general knowledge structures such as schemas, expectations, 
and stereotypes. Thus, limitations on cognitive capacity do not seem to be responsible for the 
effects of mood on persuasion. It seems more plausible that participants in positive moods 
process persuasive arguments less systematically because their affective cues signal that they 
have already done sufficient processing (Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993). 
This notion is consistent with the view that affective states confer informational value when it 
comes to cognitive processing (Clore, 1992; Clore et al., 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, 
1996). According to this account, negative moods indicate a problematic environment, whereas 
positive moods signal a safe and benign environment. As a cognitive consequence, people in 
bad moods are more likely to engage in systematic processing, whereas people in good moods 
are less likely to engage in effortful processing, and instead, do more heuristic processing. 
Consistent with the assumption that mood states signal processing requirements, Sinclair et al. 
(1994) found that the impact of mood states on persuasion can be eliminated when their 
informational value is called into question. Following the procedure described earlier 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983), students were approached on either a sunny or a rainy day. While 
they were exposed to persuasive messages, their attention was, or was not, drawn to the weather 
as an external, irrelevant source of their mood. Only when participants did not focus on the 
weather as the cause of their feelings did the usual influence of mood on persuasion occur, 
with happy participants being equally persuaded by strong and weak arguments and sad 
participants being persuaded by strong arguments only. When attention was drawn to the 
weather, participants discounted the affective information, eliminating its influence on 
persuasion. Thus, affect serves as an implicit signal for the kind of cognitive processing strategy to 
pursue, but it loses this function when the feelings are experienced as task irrelevant. 
A somewhat different perspective has been put forward by Petty and colleagues (Petty, 
DeSteno, & Rucker, 2001; Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993). In line with 
their elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), they argue that affective cues 
serve different functions depending on the likelihood of cognitive elaboration. According to this 
model, classical conditioning is an example of a direct affective influence under conditions of 
low elaboration: An attitude object that has become associated with positive affect is evaluated 
positively, whereas an attitude object that has become associated with negative affect is evaluated 
negatively (Razran, 1940). In other words, mood functions as a direct, peripheral cue when 
elaboration likelihood is low. In contrast, when elaboration likelihood is high, such as when the 
attitude object is highly personally relevant, the relevance of the mood itself 
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is judged, and mood has an influence on attitudes that is mediated by the affectively toned 
thoughts generated by the mood. Finally, moderate elaboration conditions are hypothesized to 
influence persuasion in the manner that resulted in the differential interaction effects of mood 
state and argument quality observed by Mackie and Worth (1989), and Bless and colleagues 
(1990, 1992). 
The affect as information and elaboration-likelihood positions are not entirely dissimilar. 
Petty and colleagues suggest that negative affect should lead to more central processing and 
positive affect to more peripheral processing. Similarly, a cognitive tuning explanation suggests 
that negative affect implies a problematic situation, leading participants to engage in systematic 
processing, and positive affect signals a benign situation, leading participants to engage in 
heuristic processing. There are variations on how best to phrase an informational view. An 
alternative, for example, would be to predict that positive moods lead to the use of accessible 
information and negative moods to decreased use of such information. If one assumes that the 
most accessible information in the persuasion studies is the persuasive argument presented, 
then happy recipients may be prone to accept them, and sad recipients prone not to rely on 
such accessible information, but to scrutinize the details of the arguments. Such systematic 
processing leads them to accept or reject the arguments on their merits: to reject weak and 
accept strong arguments. 
Loose ends in these explanations have been pointed out by Wyer et al. (1999) who noted that 
even in the original data by Bless et al. (1990), happy recipients were found to counterargue 
more than sad recipients, which is inconsistent with the idea that positive affect leads to less 
systematic processing. 
Although some evidence favors the elaboration-likelihood model (see Wegener & Petty, 
2001), other data are harder to reconcile with it. For example, findings from the Bless et al. 
(1990) studies appear inconsistent. These researchers included a condition that led to high 
elaboration (specific instructions to evaluate argument quality), but they did not find the main 
effect of mood that would be predicted by the elaboration likelihood model. Further, working 
while being distracted could be considered a low elaboration condition, but it also did not result in a 
direct effect of mood. Finally, Sinclair et al. (1994) also used a manipulation that could be 
characterized as a high elaboration condition. The participants consisted of students for 
whom comprehensive final exams were very relevant, because the introduction of the exams in 
the near future was presented as a distinct possibility. One concern about the multiple role 
model of affect has been that it does not unambiguously determine what factors count as low, 
moderate or high levels of elaboration (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
In addition to specifying when people use affect in persuasive messages, a model of when 
they correct for its influence has also been outlined (Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener & 
Petty, 1997). A related, two-step model that specifies one process for both the usage and the 
discounting of affective information has recently been proposed by Albarracín and Kumkale 
(2003). These authors propose that affect confers information in persuasion situations if, and 
only if, two conditions are met: First, message recipients must notice their affective reaction, 
and second, they must judge it as relevant. If people either fail to attend to their feelings or 
do attend to them, but attribute them to an irrelevant cause, then affect may play no role in 
persuasion. To actually have an influence, affect must be noticed, but not be judged irrele- 
vant. One implication of their model is that at low levels of thought, increases in attention 
to one's feelings may increase the role of irrelevant affective influences, whereas further in 
creases in attention may decrease affective influences (see also Gasper & Clore, 2000; Gohm 
& Clore, 2000). They suggest, therefore, that the motivation and ability to process argu- 
ments systematically should be associated with persuasion in a curvilinear manner, so that 
irrelevant affect should influence persuasion primarily for moderate levels of motivation and 
ability. 
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Although such irrelevant affective influences implicate low motivation or ability to correctly 
attribute feelings, the influence of relevant affect generated by considering the arguments them-
selves do not. Indeed, argument-induced affect might play the biggest role among individuals 
most motivated and able to make correct attributions. Specifically, Albarracín and Kumkale 
(2003) predicted that reduced ability and motivation should have a curvilinear effect on the 
impact of irrelevant (mood-based) affect, but should linearly reduce the impact of message-
induced (relevant) affect. 
Indeed, they found that when either motivation or ability was low, participants' attitudes 
were strongly influenced by the experimental mood induction. Presumably, low ability in 
combination with high motivation, or low motivation in combination with high ability allowed 
participants to go through the first step of the model, affect identification, but prevented them 
from proceeding to the next stage, discounting the affective reaction as irrelevant. In contrast, 
when both ability and motivation were high, participants were able to discount the effects of the 
mood induction, and thus eliminated its influence on their attitude. Finally, when both ability 
and motivation were low, participants were unlikely to even complete the first stage of the 
process, affect identification, and thus, also showed no effects of affect on their attitudes. 
Overall, this research integrates the motivational and attentional capacity aspects of earlier 
models into the affect-as-information framework, and provides compelling evidence for it. 
Persuasion and Affect Regulation. In the studies reviewed thus far, affect can be seen 
as providing information about the persuasion situation or the quality of the arguments. Such 
informational functions come into play under conditions of performance motivation. 
Sometimes, however, people may be more motivated to feel good than to perform well. Thus, 
when driving to work, one might switch from a news station to a music station on the radio if 
one's momentary motivation to maintain one's mood were greater than one's motivation to be 
well informed. Wegener, Petty, and Smith (1995) induced such hedonic motivation by 
emphasizing the enjoyable versus depressing nature of their persuasive material. When 
individuals expected the persuasive arguments to be uplifting, those in happy moods were more, 
rather than less, likely than those in sad moods to differentiate strong and weak arguments. The 
authors proposed the hedonic contingency model (HCM) which suggests that the usual mood 
effects on the processing of strong and weak arguments can also reflect the unpleasantness of 
thinking deeply about counterattitudinal material. That is, if individuals were momentarily 
focused more on enjoyment than performance, those in happy moods might want to avoid 
such unpleasant thoughts, producing the reverse of the usual mood and processing effect. 
Similar reversals of mood effects were reported by Martin et al. (1993) on liking, as opposed to 
persuasion, when they similarly manipulated emphasized hedonic over performance concerns. 
Persuasion and Affective Messages. All of the research reviewed above deals with the 
effects of emotional states on processing persuasive communications. Additional work has been 
conducted where the affective component is not in the mood state of the recipient, but in the 
persuasive message itself. This research falls into two categories, namely, the work on fear 
appeals (for a detailed review, see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), and the work that compares 
cognitive and emotional message content (Edwards, 1990; Edwards & von Hippel, 1995; 
Fabrigar & Petty, 1999; Rosselli, Skelly, & Mackie, 1995). 
In a classic study, Janis and Feshbach (1953) investigated the influence of various levels of 
fearful content on compliance with a persuasive appeal. Participants received information about the 
benefits of brushing one's teeth. For the high fear appeal, participants were presented with very 
graphic images of tooth decay, whereas for the low fear appeal, participants were presented 
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with X rays of cavities and pictures of healthy teeth. A medium fear appeal condition consisted of 
pictures with a moderate level of depicted tooth decay. Two findings were noteworthy: First, 
compared to the other two fear conditions, participants in the high fear condition showed the 
lowest amount of reported compliance with the message of the communication, tooth 
brushing. Second, these participants were also more susceptible to counterarguments that they 
were exposed to one week after the original study. Thus, these authors and others (Hovland, 
Janis, & Kelley, 1953) suggested that high fear appeals tend to result in a defensive reaction, 
where message recipients actively try to minimize the threat's reality and relevance in their 
own life. 
However, research in the years to follow did not necessarily find the same kind of evidence 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), and others concluded that high fear appeals in fact do lead to increased 
persuasion (Boster & Mongeau, 1984). Extensions of the work on fear appeals (Rogers, 1983) 
went on to include mediating cognitive aspects, such as one's own perceived vulnerability to the 
threat, and one's sense of efficacy in dealing with it. Recent work has also addressed the match 
of the persuasive message with the mood state of the perceiver. For instance, Sengupta and Johar 
(2001) found that under some conditions, anxiety leads to improved elaboration of the 
persuasive message. When participants experiencing high levels of anxiety were given a 
message that was very relevant to their anxiety, they elaborated it extensively. In contrast, 
interference of high anxiety was found when they were given a message that was unrelated to the 
source of their anxiety. These authors argue that higher motivation to process the message can 
compensate for cognitive deficits associated with high anxiety (cf. Eysenck, 1982). Along similar 
lines, Petty and colleagues (Petty et al., 2001) concluded in their review of the literature on 
persuasion using fear appeals that when people feel competent and motivated to bring about 
an action in the face of likely threat, then fear appeals can be very effective. If, on the other 
hand, people feel that they do not possess the necessary skills or resources to deal with the 
threatening message, then messages with fear appeal can have the unintended effect of 
resulting in denial of the persuasive message, and as a consequence, less elaboration of its 
content. 
Rather than being specific to fear, persuasive messages can differ in whether the content 
focuses on affective or on cognitive information (Edwards, 1990; Edwards & von Hippel, 
1995; Fabrigar & Petty, 1999). For example, Edwards (1990) found that persuasive appeals 
were more successful when the appeal matched the content of the initial attitude formation, 
such that attitudes that had been formed on an affective basis were more easily changed by 
affectively toned appeals, whereas attitudes that had been formed on a cognitive basis were 
more easily changed by a cognitive appeal. However, mismatching effects for affective and 
cognitive appeals have also been reported (Millar & Millar, 1990). In Edwards' (1990) 
work, participants had either tasted a beverage (affective appeal) or read about its benefits 
(cognitive appeal), so it could be objected that the affective appeal involved a direct 
experience of the attitude objects, whereas the cognitive appeal did not. In subsequent work, 
Fabrigar and Petty (1999, experiment 2) conducted a study where both kinds of appeals 
consisted of an indirect experience. Participants learned about an unfamiliar animal, a 
"lemphur," and were exposed to either affective or cognitive information about it. They were 
able to confirm the presence of matching effects when controlling for direct versus indirect 
experience. 
Zanna and Rempel (1988) suggested that there may be individual differences in whether 
people's attitudes are more consistent with the favorability of their feelings or more consistent 
with the favorability of their beliefs. Huskinson and Haddock (2004) recently pursued this idea 
and found considerable individual differences. In addition, they found that attempts to change 
attitudes that were affective or cognitive were more successful when they were consistent with the 
individual's general tendency to base their attitudes on affect or beliefs. 
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Summary. In happy moods, people tend to be persuaded equally by strong and weak 
arguments, whereas in sad moods, people are persuaded only by strong arguments and reject 
weak arguments. Whereas some investigators (Worth & Mackie, 1987) assume that happy 
moods reduce processing resources, others (Bless & Schwarz, 1999) propose that individuals in 
happy moods engage in heuristic processing because of the positive information conveyed by 
their feelings. In addition, Bless et al. (1996) showed that rather than engaging in heuristic 
processing because of reduced resources, individuals in happy moods actually have spare 
resources because they are engaging in heuristic processing. Still others (Sinclair et al., 1993) 
have shown that such mood effects can be eliminated if the feelings of mood are attributed to the 
weather. 
From a somewhat different perspective, Petty and colleagues (1993; 2001) show that mood can 
have multiple effects depending on the likelihood of cognitively elaborating persuasive 
messages. Extending this logic, Albarracín and Kumkale (2003) proposed a two stage model of 
mood effects. They suggest that whether mood has an effect or not depends first on whether or not 
the message recipients notice their affect, and second, whether or not they judge it as relevant. 
Finally, research has also been done on affect elicited by persuasive messages themselves. For 
example, Janis and Feshbach's (1953) classic work on the effectiveness of fear appeals has been 
revisited (Petty et al., 2001) with the suggestion that whether fear appeals are effective or not 
depends on the ability of message recipients to cope. It was finally noted that whether factual or 
emotional appeals work best may depend on how the attitudes in question were originally 
established (Edwards, 1990). 
Affect and Cognitive Dissonance 
In addition to changing attitudes via persuasive arguments, another method of attitude change 
beloved by social psychologists is through cognitive dissonance. In everyday life, too, an ef-
fective method of change can be to point out to people their inconsistencies. Young children are 
often alarmingly observant in spotting inconsistencies in parental rules and pronouncements. 
The traditional explanation for dissonance emphasized the role of uncomfortable tension elicited by 
an awareness of the inconsistency between beliefs and freely chosen actions (Festinger, 1957). In 
contrast to the original theory and later attributional interpretations (Cooper & Fazio, 1984), 
recent treatments of dissonance have emphasized affect rather than arousal, by assuming that 
dissonance is an emotional state of discomfort (Elliott & Devine, 1994; Harmon-Jones, 2001; 
Higgins, Rhodewalt, & Zanna, 1979; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990; Van Overwalle & Jordens, 
2002). Olson and Stone (this volume) provide a fuller discussion of these studies. Moore (2003) 
has proposed an affect-as-information interpretation of dissonance-based attitude change. He had 
participants write counterattitudinal essays supporting tuition increases at their university. 
Counterattitudinal behavior under choice conditions is expected to produce cognitive dissonance, 
which Moore characterized as a negative state. After their essays, participants wrote about 
happy or sad life events to induce mood. As predicted, positive affect provided an "all clear" 
that eliminated dissonance-based attitude change. 
Rather than increasing attitude change, as might be expected, sad moods can also reduce 
change for a different reason. Sad participants took the opportunity to attribute all their negative 
affect, including the negative affect of dissonance, to the immediately preceding, and relatively 
salient, mood induction procedure. Prior research (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) had shown that 
people are more likely to explain negative than positive affect, since negative affect signals a 
problem that needs attention. Accordingly, the negative mood group attributed their affect to the 
mood induction procedure and tended not to engage in dissonance-based attitude change. The 
salience of the negative mood manipulation appears to have served as a lightning rod to draw 
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off dissonance-based affect by changing its meaning. Thus, taking an affect-as-information 
approach, Moore (2003) has provided a contemporary reinterpretation of cognitive dissonance as 
negative affect. His data suggested that dissonance effects could be eliminated either by 
providing positive affect as an antidote to dissonance or by changing the apparent source, (and 
hence the information value), of the negative affect of dissonance. The attribution of affect 
finding is similar to the attribution of arousal finding obtained much earlier (Zanna & Cooper, 
1976). 
Persuasion and the Affective Immediacy Principle. Although positive affect 
reduced attitude change in Moore's (2003) experiments, Rhodewalt and Corner (1979) have 
reported the opposite result. Comparing the two studies, one suspects that the influence of 
affective cues on attitude change and persuasion depends on when affect enters the picture. 
Moore (2003) found less attitude change when he introduced happy mood after essay writing, 
because positive mood nullified the dissonance-induced discomfort that usually elicits attitude 
change. But Rhodewalt and Comer (1979) found more attitude change when participants smiled 
during their writing of the counterattitudinal essays. This occurred presumably because smiling 
informed participants that they were happy about the persuasive message (which would have 
been their focus) rather than being happy about their own attitude. These findings are consistent 
with our assumption that the impact of affect ultimately depends on what is in focus at the 
time (Clore et al., 2001). 
Further support comes from results reported by Briñol and Petty (2003), who found that 
affective cues from head nodding and shaking could either increase or decrease persuasion, 
depending on whether participants were having positive or negative thoughts about persuasive 
messages at the time. More generally, these results are all consistent with the idea expressed in 
the "affective immediacy principle" (Clore et al., 2001), which says that, "affective feelings tend 
to be experienced as reactions to current mental content." 
Affect as Evidence 
Another indirect influence of affect on attitude formation stems from the fact that people 
tend to believe what they feel. This observation has been expressed as a feelings-as-evidence 
hypothesis (Clore & Gasper, 2000): 
The Feelings-as-Evidence hypothesis is that belief-consistent feelings may be experienced as 
confirmation of those beliefs. Evidence from the sensations of feeling may be treated like sensory 
evidence from the external environment, so that something both believed propositionally and also felt 
emotionally may seem especially valid. In this sense ... feeling is believing, (p. 25) 
The hypothesis suggests that, for example, feeling negative affect at the same time as one 
entertains negative thoughts may validate them and give them gravity. Indeed, the subjective 
experience of affect can serve almost like a sixth sense, dedicated not to vision, audition, or 
touch, but to evaluation. Versions of this idea have recently been expressed in other related 
hypotheses, which we describe briefly. 
Affect Confirmation. The affect confirmation hypothesis is that people weight affect-
consistent information more than affect-inconsistent information in evaluative judgments. 
Adaval (2001) tested her idea in a consumer study, mentioned earlier. She manipulated mood 
using videos, and then collected judgments about several consumer products. Product information 
included brand names and positive or negative product attributes (e.g., for sneakers, a soft, flexible 
sole vs. a hard, inflexible sole). Analyses showed that as raters evaluated the products, they gave 
more weight to positive attributes when they were themselves in positive moods, 
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and more weight to negative information when they were in negative moods. The experienced 
affect seemed to serve as evidence of the importance of similarly-valenced attributes. 
Affective Certainty. Tamir, Robinson, and Clore (2002) propose a related model to 
explain enhanced performance on self-relevant reaction time tasks when actual feelings (of 
mood) matched beliefs about usual feelings (trait affect). The idea again was that affective 
experience could provide confirming data for self theories, and that (relative to states of affective 
disconfirmation) such affective certainty would make people more efficient at accessing their 
attitudes or deciding between wanted things (e.g., love) and unwanted things (e.g., disease). 
Four experiments found just such performance benefits on attitude-relevant tasks, and not on 
tasks with no personal relevance (e.g., recognizing animal words). 
Self-Validation. A different, but related idea has been proposed independently by Briñol and 
Petty (2003). This hypothesis does not focus on experienced affect, but suggests that cues such as 
head nods and arm flexion may be experienced as validation of thoughts that come to mind. They 
note that one's ideas would seem to be validated if others nodded their heads and invalidated if 
others shook their heads. In several experiments they examined whether one's own head 
movements would serve a similar validating or invalidating function (see also Epley & Gilovich, 
2001, 2004). 
In a persuasion paradigm, they presented either strong or weak persuasive arguments. 
They reasoned that people would have positive thoughts about strong arguments and negative 
thoughts about weak arguments. Moreover, head nods should validate and head shaking should 
invalidate whatever thoughts were current. As expected, they found that in response to strong 
arguments, people were more persuaded when they nodded and less persuaded when they shook 
their heads. Especially interesting was confirmation of the expectation that in response to weak 
arguments, the reverse should occur. Indeed, shaking one's head "no" after weak arguments 
produced more persuasion than after strong ones. Essentially, the double negative of head 
shaking in response to negative thoughts increased the persuasiveness of weak arguments. 
They also measured thought confidence and showed that it played a mediational role. More 
generally, they showed that self-produced affective information (in the form of head nodding 
and shaking) acted like an experiential validation of participants' thoughts. 
Summary. In this final segment of the indirect effects section of the chapter, we noted that 
renewed interest in cognitive dissonance effects has begun to emphasize the negativity rather 
than the arousal components of dissonance. For example, some investigators have found that 
positive affect seems to nullify the motivation for dissonance reduction. Indeed, examination 
of an affect-as-information model of dissonance phenomena (Moore, 2003) found 
elimination of dissonance effects, either from positive affect or from misattributions of the 
negative affect of dissonance. 
Another kind of indirect influence occurs when affect acts as evidence for some affectively 
similar belief. We proposed that affect functions rather like a sixth sense. Positive and negative 
feelings provide affective experiences of value, just as rough and smooth feelings provide tactile 
experiences of texture, or sensations of lightness and darkness provide visual experiences of 
illumination. Adaval (2001) found affect confirmation effects in which feelings of mood seemed to 
confirm the positive or negative value of product attributes. Similarly, Tamir et al. (2002) 
found affective certainty effects when people's general affective beliefs about themselves were 
confirmed by their current feelings. Such congruence made them fast in making decisions about 
things they wanted or did not want. And Briñol and Petty (2003) found that persuasion effects 
could be altered by nodding or shaking one's head when these movement were experienced as 
self-validation or invalidation of thoughts about persuasive messages. This sample of research 
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rounds out our consideration of the indirect influences of affect and affect-relevant action on 
attitude. 
We turn next to a consideration of some larger issues about affect and cognition in attitude. 
Issues About Affect and Cognition 
Western thought has tended to cast emotion and cognition into conflicting roles. But social 
psychologists (Salovey & Mayer, 1990) and neuroscientists (Damasio, 1994) now suggest that 
emotion fosters rather than hinders adaptive rationality. For these and other reasons, research on 
emotion has skyrocketed in recent years, becoming one of the most sought-after intellectual 
exports from psychology (McLemee, 2003). Indeed, the pace of development and export has 
been so rapid that natural corrective forces have not kept pace. In this section, we review work 
that suggests that second thoughts are in order about some widely held ideas about affect, 
including the "automatic evaluation effect" and the "low road to emotion." 
Automatic Evaluation Effect? 
Attitudes help us anticipate the consequences of situations so that we can act accordingly. 
Hence, it can be important for attitude objects to be able to elicit affect readily (Fazio & Powell, 
1997). One of the most important demonstrations of such automatic evaluative reactions was a 
study of affective priming by Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986). They found faster 
evaluations of target words when primes of similar valence preceded the words by about 300 ms. 
Thus, seeing a positive word (e.g., "friend") facilitated categorizing another word (e.g., 
"birthday") as positive relative to categorizing a negative word (e.g., "anger") as negative (see 
Klauer, 1998, for a review). 
The effectiveness of such evaluative congruence in speeding performance suggests that 
people may automatically evaluate stimuli. The fact that a similar effect occurs even when the 
task is not explicitly about evaluative categorization led Bargh (1997) to conclude that objects 
are processed evaluatively before they are processed descriptively. However, others (Rolls, 
1999) assume that objects are first classified descriptively (at some level) before affective 
analysis. 
Storbeck and Robinson (2004) explicitly examined whether evaluative or descriptive priming 
is more basic. They noted that most studies of evaluative priming include words (as primes and 
targets) that vary systematically in evaluative meaning but not also in descriptive meaning. As a 
result, research participants are left with no choice but to implicitly categorize primes and targets 
evaluatively, because no descriptive categories are consistently available. If so, then such 
studies may provide evidence that people engage in automatic stimulus classifications of some 
kind, but may be relevant to whether evaluative classifications have a favored status. 
To test this hypothesis, Storbeck and Robinson (2004) repeated standard priming studies, 
varying evaluative and descriptive similarity independently. Thus, their words included positive 
and negative animal words (e.g., puppy, spider) and positive and negative texture words (e.g., 
silky, rough), or in some cases, religious words (e.g., angel, Hell). In three experiments, they 
consistently found descriptive priming, but not evaluative priming. Three different methods-an 
evaluative task, a descriptive task, and a lexical decision task-all led to the same conclusion. 
Evaluative priming was found only when they eliminated the possibility of using descriptive 
similarity between primes and targets, as other investigators had inadvertently done before 
them. 
These results suggest that declarative memory is organized descriptively, rather than eval-
uatively. Indeed, the utility of a system in which the activation of one negative concept would 
activate all other negative concepts, even a little bit, is unclear. Storbeck and Robinson (2004) 
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review a variety of behavioral, neurological, and electrophysiological studies relevant to the 
question and conclude: "These results are rather dramatic in suggesting that affective analysis is 
typically dependent, or parasitic, on some prior semantic analysis." Similar conclusions about 
the priority of semantic analysis have also been reached by De Houwer and Randell (2004) 
using a pronunciation task. 
Of course, people probably do evaluate just about everything they encounter, and they 
presumably do so automatically. Evaluation, moreover, is the most powerful dimension of 
connotative meaning, and according to Osgood, this is true of all words in all languages 
(Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). Also, people can decode evaluative meaning indepen-
dently of semantic meaning in the real world via tone of voice, prosody of speech, and manner of 
expression. Indeed, automatic inferences about evaluative word meanings can occur even on such 
extrasemantic bases as whether words are printed in light or dark fonts (Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 
2004) and whether words appear up or down on a computer screen (Meier & Robinson, 2004). 
But apart from such presentational considerations, the evaluative meanings of the words 
themselves probably cannot be processed independently of their descriptive meanings. Thus, 
evidence for the "automatic evaluation effect" adduced from studies of affective priming may 
need a second look, as recent data suggest an "automatic categorization effect" rather than an 
"automatic evaluation effect." 
The "Low Road" to Emotion? 
A related issue in psychology concerns whether or not emotion arises out of cognitive appraisals 
(interpretations of stimuli) or whether emotion plays by its own rules. One position in this debate is 
captured in Zajonc's (1980) proposal that, "Preferences need no inferences." Zajonc (2001) and 
others taking a related view (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004) often cite as supporting 
evidence LeDoux's discovery of a possible "low road" to emotion (e.g., LeDoux, Romanski, & 
Xagoraris, 1989). This work established aversive conditioning in rats by pairing electric shock 
with a change in the illumination of a light. The procedure was successful despite the fact that 
lesions had eliminated the visual cortex from the circuit. Conditioning was accomplished via a 
subcortical pathway going directly from the sensory thalamus (where sensory signals are 
processed) to the amygdala (which is important in emotional reactions) without first going to the 
cerebral cortex. The results were important because they showed activation of emotion-
relevant reactions (avoidance) without involvement of the cortex. These results show that an 
emotion-relevant response can occur before the object of the emotion could be identified (even 
implicitly) at the cortical level and before one could feel an emotion. By this low route, 
information about possible threat could apparently reach the amygdala by a direct route 7 ms 
before it could arrive indirectly via the cortex. It has been argued that these few milliseconds 
would have conferred a survival advantage. 
These findings and their subsequent dissemination (LeDoux, 1996) have fired the imagi-
nation of social science writers (Goleman, 1995) as potential ways of explaining phenomena in 
social psychology (Zajonc, 1998), political science (McDermott, 2003), advertising, and 
related disciplines. Does this low road to affect really offer a new view of attitude formation? 
The amygdala may be important for attitude, since this small, almond-shaped organ plays a 
critical role in fear and possibly other emotions. But can attitudes be created via the "low road" to 
the amygdala without cortical involvement? 
Storbeck (2004) has recently reviewed the literature relevant to LeDoux's discovery for its 
relevance to social psychologists. He concluded that the low route discussed by LeDoux 
probably has little relevance to phenomena in social psychology. The evidence suggests that 
only very simple stimuli can be detected using this low road, such as changes in illumination, 
which is what LeDoux used as a CS. Without the involvement of the visual cortex, the 
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pictures, faces, or words generally used as stimuli in social psychological experiments cannot be 
discriminated. Hence, the "low road" to emotion that LeDoux found for rats probably does not 
hold much promise for explaining human attitudes. 
Some findings also suggest that direct connections between the thalamus and the amygdala 
diminish as one moves up the phylogenetic scale, and that they may not exist at all in primates and 
humans (Dolan, 2000; Kudo, Glendenning, Frost, & Masterson, 1986). Of course, there are 
other subcortical routes to the amygdala in humans. However, the larger conclusion is that 
evaluative reactions appear to be generally dependent on cortical analyses. Even the 
subcortical routes that play a role in visual detection are thoroughly intertwined with cortical 
areas. A similar interplay between cortical and subcortical processes is apparent in affect (see 
Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000, for reviews). It is probably not the 
case, therefore, that attitudes, judgments, and behaviors in humans are adequately explained by 
the "low road" idea. 
It should be clear, however, that success in tracing pathways to the amygdala has been a major 
breakthrough, which has spurred examination of subcortical affective processes generally. We 
assume that further research will show additional subcortical contributions to affect, and hence to 
attitude in humans. However, the surprisingly popular idea that affect is fundamentally 
subcortical is not consistent with the data (Davidson, 2003). Hence, contrary to the wealth of 
recent citations by social scientists, low road accounts are implausible explanations of affective 
influences on attitudes, consumer choices, or political preferences. 
Summary 
Because affective forces seem powerful and resist control, many psychologists believe that 
affective and evaluative processes occur earlier and are more fundamental than cognitive and 
descriptive processes. However, research increasingly suggests that this conclusion may be 
misguided. Many aspects of affective processing are automatic and unconscious, of course, 
but that is also true of ordinary cognitive processing. Also, organisms do place a high priority on 
evaluative information, but in head to head comparisons, descriptive priming appears to trump 
evaluative priming unless evaluative categorization is made salient. 
Recent research also casts doubt on the relevance for social psychology of what has been 
called the "low road to emotion." LeDoux's (1996) demonstration of aversive conditioning in 
rats via a rapid subcortical route from the sensory thalamus directly to the amygdala was a 
landmark achievement. However, the assumption that such findings might illuminate human 
emotions may be unwarranted. Although subcortical processing doubtlessly plays an important role 
in emotion, such processes are thoroughly intertwined with higher, cortical processing. 
In the final section, we turn from existing ideas about affect that we think have been 
misapplied to a discussion of three new ideas that may be useful in understanding affect and 
attitudes. 
Affective Attitudes as Emergent and Embodied 
Evaluative Constancy 
 Multiple Kinds of Affect 
Our review of affective influences on attitude has examined a variety of processes as though 
they act in isolation. In fact, however, we expect that powerful attitudes often emerge from 
multiple affective sources. Strack and colleagues (see Neumann & Strack, 2000; Neumann, 
Forster, & Strack, 2003) have discussed multiple affective manifestations such as positive and 
negative feelings and approach and avoidance behavior, but our point concerns multiple kinds 
of affect.  
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If affect and attitude are both representations of value, what is the source of that value? 
How do we know that something is good or bad? As indicated at the beginning, Ortony et al. 
(1988) propose three sources of value (goals, standards, and tastes), which underlie three kinds 
of affect (being pleased at outcomes, approving of actions, and liking objects). These in turn 
are bases for three kinds of evaluation (e.g., utilitarian, moral, and aesthetic). These different 
kinds of good are not really comparable. Thus, one cannot fix a price on morality. Indeed, 
attempts to do so are the stuff of tragedy, as dramatized in Goethe's Faust. 
In addition, the case can be made that sensations become compelling perceptions of reality to 
the extent that they transcend simple sensory accounting. For example, we see objects in 
hologram-like reality when both eyes provide parallel, but slightly different images of the 
same thing. Presumably, such emergence reflects the fact that it is computationally simpler to 
perceive one object as "out there" rather than seeing two highly redundant sensory images. In 
analogous fashion, we suggest that emotional realities may emerge from parallel perceptions of 
multiple kinds of good or bad in a single object. Consider a leader whose policies are seen as 
good in a utilitarian sense, whose actions seem moral, and who is also personally attractive or 
eloquent. A combination of these different affective reactions (being pleased, approving, 
liking) might command a degree of loyalty to the leader none of them by themselves could elicit. 
Similarly, people fall in love, not only because their beloved may be good for them in some way 
(being pleased), but perhaps also because the person's actions may seem excellent or admirable 
(approving), and because the person him or herself may be beautiful or handsome (liking). 
From such diverse sources, the person's goodness may be beyond mental accounting, creating 
what may be experienced as a transcendent reality that may not be shared in the perceptions of 
others. In a different, but related formulation, Thagard and Nerb (2002) conceptualize affective 
processes as "emotional gestalts," reflecting the dynamical nature of an "emotional state as a 
gestalt that emerges from a complex of interacting environmental, bodily, and cognitive 
variables" (Thagard & Nerb, 2002, p. 275). 
We are suggesting that to the extent that, like emotions, attitudes have multiple constituents, 
they can take on a life of their own, because of the incommensurability of the multiple affective 
reactions from which they stem. Research on mood (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) suggests that the 
influence of affect on judgment depends on the implicit mental accounting for the affect. Thus, 
attitudes from multiple, incomparable sources may be powerful, as love and hate are powerful, 
in part because they resist attributional accounting and transcend the constraints on evaluation 
that such accounting seem to bring (Wilson, Gilbert, & Centerbar, 2003). In addition to this 
process, however, affectively-based attitudes may also be powerful because they are embodied. 
Embodied Evaluation 
Traditionally psychologists have focused on the belief components of attitude. Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975), however, have pointed out that it is the evaluative component of belief that 
contributes the main portion of an attitude. The point of an affective approach to attitude is to 
broaden the concept to include evaluative aspects that go beyond evaluative beliefs. Research 
increasingly makes it clear that evaluative feelings, in addition to evaluative beliefs, influence 
attitudes. Attitude objects about which one has strong beliefs also have the capacity to elicit 
evaluative feelings (Fazio & Powell, 1997). The power of attitude, like the power of emotion, 
lies in the fact that attitudes can be experienced as well as known. Thus, it is possible that the 
study of attitudes, certainly the study of affect and attitudes, may be informed by the idea of 
embodiment. Affective processes are fundamentally embodied: Bodily processes such as 
expressive behaviors, physiological changes, and actions are central components of the 
subjective experience of affect. 
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In recent years, a related concept of "embodied cognition" has become prominent in cognitive 
science. Investigators of embodied cognition assume that cognitive processes are influenced and 
constrained by the way we function in the world with our bodies (Barsalou, 1999; Clark, 1997; 
Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff& Johnson, 1999; Varela, Thompson, &Rosch, 1991). The same 
assumptions that underlie the idea of embodied cognition are applicable to embodied affect 
(Schnall, 2004). For example, central to the embodied cognition position is the assumption 
that cognition ultimately serves action, and a similar assumption can be made about affect 
and emotion. Thus, affect provides information about the liking or disliking of objects and 
situations, and about the value of pursuing or avoiding particular actions. Similarly, we assume 
that attitudes serve not merely as mental structures of preference, but also as a compass for 
action. 
A second assumption is that both cognitive and affective processes are constrained not only 
contextually, but also by the nature of the human body. Affectively relevant bodily cues can 
consist of facial expressions, postures, or general behaviors of approach and avoidance, and all 
of these provide powerful influences on attitudes, as discussed by Olson and Stone (this 
volume). Finally, a third shared assumption concerns emergent properties. Both affective and 
cognitive processes involve emergent properties that arise in nonlinear ways and that result in 
action-relevant consequences. Overall, this position derives from the realization that investigators 
need to treat the evolution of human cognitive and affective processes as components of the 
evolution of human bodies (Schnall, 2003). In line with this functional orientation toward affect 
and attitudes, we conclude this chapter with the thought that one function served by attitude 
is to provide affective constancy, which would appear to be important in everyday social 
relations. 
Attitudes Afford Evaluative Constancy 
How do one's momentary affective experiences become attitudes? It can be instructive to think 
about attitudes as analogous to perceptions. An overarching aim of the perceptual system 
appears to be to construct perceptual constancy from sensory variation. Thus, a tabletop exists as 
a rectangle of constant size in our perception, even though our actual retinal image of the 
table top may change dramatically in size and shape as we pass by. With this perceptual 
constancy as a model, one can view attitudes as the outcome of processes directed toward 
affective constancy. We do not react to visual or auditory stimuli as such, but rather to a model of 
the thing seen or heard (Bregman, 1990). Thus, for example, when a car passes between us and a 
person across the street, we do not assume that she ceased to exist, despite the fact that she 
disappears from our retina momentarily. Perception is aimed at establishing the constancies 
that lie behind our changing sensory representations. 
Person perception also deals with constructed models of others, rather than with specific 
behaviors. We do not cease to perceive others as "friendly" or "trustworthy" during their 
absence. Momentary disagreements with friends and family do not usually end the relationship or 
make us adopt new attitudes toward them. This is true, we assume, because the others with 
whom we interact are really virtual others or models of others. We do not simply react to the 
words and behaviors we hear and see in an online, bottom-up fashion. They are framed and 
given meaning as the words and behaviors of an idealized mental entity (Blascovich, 2002; 
Heise, 1979). 
Such affective models help maintain love, loyalty, and commitment to partners, teams, 
organizations, causes, political parties, candidates, products, and ideas. We may retain our 
identities as fans even when our team loses, and we remain loyal Americans, Israelis, or 
Japanese even when our candidate or party is not in power. One's mental models of objects 
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allows us to maintain object constancy despite visual occlusion or gaps in attention. So too 
one's attitude toward others affords the evaluative constancy so indispensable to social life. 
Conclusions and Summary 
In this section we summarize what we have covered and list (in italics) 20 tentative conclusions. 
The first half of this chapter is titled, "Direct Influence of Affect on Attitude," which is divided 
into valence-based and arousal-based influences. We suggested that: (1 )  Two dimensions of 
affect, valence and arousal, each play a different role in attitude formation. The valence 
component can be thought of as embodied evaluation and the arousal component as embodied 
importance or urgency. The valence-based phenomena include affective conditioning, affective 
priming, category-triggered affect, mere exposure, and mood-congruent judgment. 
Reflecting recent trends in the literature, we distinguished classical, Pavlovian conditioning 
(which involves preparation for coping with an expected rewarding or punishing event) from 
affective association (which involves simply processing a target stimulus and a valenced stimulus 
together). The two processes turn out to be distinguishable empirically. We reviewed the classical 
studies of attitude conditioning, and suggested that, (2) Despite appearances, the 
associational process whereby rewards and punishments influence attitudes may not be an 
example of classical or Pavlovian conditioning. Attitude formation is better captured by a 
process of simple affective association than by Pavlovian classical conditioning. We also dis-
cussed limitations of conditioning as a model of attitude formation. For example, (3) Not only 
biological preparedness, but also cognitive and cultural preparedness constrain the affective 
associations people make. Moreover, we suggested that, (4) AH associational phenomena from 
conditioning to affect-as-information may depend on the same underlying Gestalt processes, 
whereby temporally contiguous experiences become a unit, providing a narrative flow from one 
moment to the next. We also discussed social psychological implications of Bloom's (2000) 
theory of mind approach to how children learn the meanings of words. His work implies that, (5) 
Children learn (affective) meanings not by bottom-up associations (John Locke), but by top-
down inferences about what others mean (Augustine). 
Returning to more molecular processes, we reviewed research on the mere exposure phe-
nomenon, concluding that rather than as originally envisioned, (6) Mere exposure effects are 
due to the positive affective consequences of the experience of cognitive fluency. 
The status of the mood and judgment literature was the next topic. Taking an affect-as-
information approach, we suggested that, (7) Implicit attributions underlie both mere exposure 
effects and mood effects on attitude. Although investigators of judgment and decision making 
refer to affective influences as "biases," and several investigators consider the use of affect as a 
judgment heuristic, we emphasized that, (8) Rather than being solely a source of judgment bias, 
affect plays an essential role in effective judgment and decision making. 
Next we noted that the influence of affective feedback on judgment and processing is not 
limited to feelings, but that similar effects can be seen with other affective cues, including 
facial expressions, subtly or unconsciously primed concepts, and even colors. We concluded 
that, (9) The spontaneity and compellingness of the evaluative information is more important 
than whether the information is in the form of visceral feelings, facial muscle contraction, 
motor action, or primed thoughts. 
Under the heading of "Attitudes toward Actions," we briefly discussed other models of 
affect and decision making, including the idea of Risk as Fear and Affect Decision Theory. 
Finally, we departed from simple notions of valence to consider how specific emotions might 
mediate attitudes toward outgroups. We reviewed Mackie and Smith's (2002) proposal that, 
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(10) Groups that are feared tend to be avoided, whereas groups responded to with anger may 
elicit an aggressive stance. 
We proposed that in addition to valence, the arousal component of affect also has direct 
effects as a marker of the importance of events. Recent work on hormones and memory show 
that, (11) The arousal elicited by important events facilitates consolidation of experiences into 
lasting attitude-relevant memories. 
In the second half of the chapter, we turned from direct to indirect influence of affect on 
attitudes. This represented a shift from an "object focus," in which affect influences evaluations of 
physical and social objects in the world, to an "action focus," in which affect influences the 
processing of attitude relevant information. We suggested that differences in whether or not 
value is transferred from affective reaction to object versus action parallels differences in the 
transfer of value from reward in classical versus instrumental conditioning or in semantic versus 
procedural learning. For example, by empowering one's own point of view, (12) Individuals in 
happy (and perhaps also angry) moods use their own categorical cognitions, including 
stereotypes, brand names, and party identification, whereas those in sad moods focus on 
individuating information about persons, products, and candidates. 
Affect also influences reactions to persuasive messages. A consistent finding is that, (13) 
Individuals in positive moods tend to be moderately persuaded by both strong and weak per-
suasive arguments, whereas individuals in sad moods tend to be persuaded only by strong 
arguments and not by weak ones. We also considered affective interpretations of cognitive 
dissonance (as opposed to traditional arousal interpretations). Research suggests that the in-
fluence of affect on dissonance-induced attitude change may depend on the timing of affect 
inductions. Such findings are consistent with the immediacy principle, which says that, (14) The 
object of affective reactions, and hence of affect-based attitudes, depends on what is in mind 
when affect is experienced. As in classical conditioning, the associations that occur in the real 
world tend to reflect the constraints imposed by cognitive and situational structure. 
A final indirect effect implicates an "affect-as-evidence" hypothesis, which predicts that, 
(15) Feelings may serve as experiential evidence for compatible thoughts and beliefs occurring at 
the time. In addition, head nods or other positive after-relevant cues may similarly serve to 
validate (and head shakes may invalidate) concurrent thoughts. 
Subsequently, two phenomena with implications for the relationship between affect and 
cognition were considered. Recent research suggests that, (16) Contrary to the "automatic 
evaluation " hypothesis, descriptive priming takes precedence over evaluative priming when the 
two are directly compared. In addition, recent contributions from cognitive neuroscience leads 
to the conclusions that, (17) Popular assumptions about a rapid "low road" to emotion, which 
elicits affect before cortical interpretation is possible, appear to be inapplicable to human 
attitude research. 
We suggested that attitudes of love and loyalty may occur when different, incommensurate 
kinds of affective information converge in the same object. We speculated that, (18) Diverse 
sources of good (or bad) may confound mental accounting to be experienced as transcendent 
goodness (or badness). We suggested, too, that, (19) The power of affect arises in part from the 
embodied nature of affect. Finally, taking a functional view, we suggested that, (20) Despite 
constantly changing affective experience, attitudes can afford an evaluative constancy that is 
indispensable to social life.  
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